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Presidential Management of
Agency Rulemaking

Harold H. Bruff*

This Article examines legal and policy issues surrounding presidential management of agency rulemaking. Its premise is that there
has been sufficient experience with this activity to justify a general
appraisal. Therefore, I examine the record of the Reagan administration's program, which is easily the most ambitious to date. Prominent controversies under that program are summarized here. The
effort is not to provide a definitive administrative history, but to
identify issues likely to arise in the future. My general conclusion is
that a presidential oversight program has its place in the administrative state, but that certain controls on its exercise need to be
adopted to keep it within appropriate bounds of law and policy.
Part I begins by outlining the constitutional framework within
which oversight operates. Part II examines the comparative abilities
of the President and Congress to manage regulation, and concludes
that there is a need for a limited executive role. Part III describes
the evolution of presidential management programs from the early
1970s to date. Part IV assesses the comparative competence of the
Office of Management and Budget and the agencies with regard to
regulatory issues as well as the relative power of these institutions.
In Part V, I examine a number of controversies over the current
program's fidelity to statutory authority. Part VI addresses the
* John S. Redditt Professor of Law, University of Texas at Austin. B.A. 1965,
Williams College; J.D. 1968, Harvard University.
An earlier version of this Article was a Report to the Administrative Conference of the
United States. I thank the Conference and its staff for their support, but they bear no
responsibility for the views expressed here.
January 1989 Vol. 57 No. 3

533

openness of executive oversight, and makes recommendations on
an appropriate degree of disclosure. Finally, in Part VII I seek criteria for identifying rulemaking functions that should be excepted
from oversight.
I.

The Constitutionality of Executive Oversight

The Constitution does not foreshadow the rise of the modern
"administrative state" that regulates so many aspects of our lives.
Instead, the federal bureaucracy is almost wholly statutory in origin
and organization, and therefore occupies an uneasy constitutional
status.' The provisions of the original Constitution that delineate
the interrelations of the three great branches of government are
skeletal-even cryptic-in nature. 2 Perhaps because of the flexibility engendered by this characteristic, they have survived almost unchanged despite the vast changes that two centuries have wrought in
the nation.3 Obviously, an accommodation of present practice to
ancient text has been requisite. It exists in the form of a considerable body of constitutional doctrine and administrative law that provides legitimacy
for modern institutions and guidance about their
4
operations.
Questions about the President's power to supervise administration in competition with Congress have always invited arguments of
Hamiltonian sweep or Jeffersonian caution. 5 A brief review of the
1. See generally A Symposium on Administrative Law: The Uneasy ConstitutionalStatus of the
Administrative Agencies, 36 AM. U.L. REv. 277 (1987).
2. See Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth
Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573, 597-601 (1984).
3. Five amendments have affected presidential elections, succession, and disability.
U.S. CONST. amend. XII (affecting the procedures governing presidential elections); U.S.
CONST. amend. XX (providing succession procedures for the President); U.S. CONST.
amend. XXII (establishing the maximum period one can hold the presidential office);
U.S. CONST. amend. XXV (establishing the procedures for presidential disability). See
also U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (providing for the direct election of senators).
4. See Elliott, INS v. Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, the Constitution, and the
Legislative Veto, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 125, 166-70; Bruff, PresidentialPowerand Administrative
Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 451, 451-55 (1979).
5. Classic arguments of this kind arose in 1793 concerning Washington's proposed
Neutrality Proclamation. SeeJ. RoCHE & L. LEvY, THE PRESIDENCY 10-12 (1964). Hamilton argued that the Proclamation was authorized by a grant of power in Article II:
The second article of the constitution of the United States, section first, establishes this general proposition, "the EXECUTIVE POWER shall be
vested in a president of the United States of America.
The same article, in a succeeding section, proceeds to delineate particular
cases of executive power ....
It would not consist with the rules of sound
construction, to consider this enumeration of particular authorities, as derogating from the more comprehensive grant in the general clause, further
than as it may be coupled with express restrictions or limitations ....

The

difficulty of a complete enumeration of all the cases of executive authority,
would naturally dictate the use of general terms, and would render it improbable, that a specification of certain particulars was designed as a substitute for those terms, when antecedently used ....

The enumeration ought

therefore to be considered, as intended merely to specify the principal articles implied in the definition of executive power; leaving the rest to flow
from the general grant of that power....
Id. at 10-11.
James Madison responded with the Jeffersonian position:
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pertinent text and the major interpretive positions will outline this
unresolved debate. Article II vests the "executive Power" in the
President. 6 At the least, this provision signifies that the Framers rejected proposals for a plural, divided executive. 7 Perhaps it means
no more than that, but presidential partisans have always read it as a
substantive grant of "executive" power, whatever that is. 8 Similarly,
the President's duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" 9 may mean only that he must enforce particular statutory
powers that Congress gives him, 10 or that he derives a broader
power to reconcile the body of legislation as a whole.I Finally, the
President has explicit power to require the "Opinion, in writing" of
department heads regarding their duties.' 2 This clause, obscure of
intent, grants the President at least some power to consult with his
bureaucratic chiefs.' 3 Its presence in the Constitution, however,
suggests that the Framers held a view of the presidency
that is diffi4
cult to reconcile with expansive views of the office.'
Congress can respond to claims of broad presidential power by
citing its Article I powers to legislate and its related authorization in
The natural province of the executive magistrate is to execute laws, as that of
the legislature is to make laws. All his acts, therefore, properly executive,
must pre-suppose the existence of the laws to be executed. A treaty is not an
execution of the laws; it does not pre-suppose the existence of laws.... To
say then that the power of making treaties which are confessedly laws, belongs naturally to the department which is to execute laws, is to say, that the
executive department naturally includes a legislative power. In theory this is
an absurdity ... in practice a tyranny....
Another important inference to be noted is, that the powers of making war
and treaty being substantially of a legislative, not an executive nature, the
rule of interpreting exceptions strictly, must narrow instead of enlarging executive pretensions on those subjects....
Id. at 11-12.
6. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1.
7. See Strauss, supra note 2, at 599-601.
8. For a more modem statement of the Hamiltonian position, see Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52, 118 (1926).
9. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
10. Myers, 272 U.S. at 177 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (stating that "[t]he duty of the
President to see that the laws be executed is a duty that does not go beyond the laws or
require him to achieve more than Congress sees fit to leave within his power").
11. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 702 (1952) (Vinson,
C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Vinson noted that "[u]nlike an administrative commission confined to the enforcement of the statute under which it was created, or the head
of a department when administering a particular statute, the President is a constitutional
officer charged with taking care that a 'mass of legislation' be executed." Id.
12. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
13. See Strauss, supra note 2, at 646-48.
14. Justice McReynolds stated:
It is beyond the ordinary imagination to picture forty or fifty capable men,
presided over by George Washington, vainly discussing, in the heat of a Philadelphia summer, whether express authority to require opinions in writing
should be delegated to a President in whom they had already vested the
illimitable power here claimed.
Myers, 272 U.S. at 207 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
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the "necessary and proper" clause to pass laws effectuating powers
vested in the other branches. 15 Today, it is generally accepted that
the President is not free to contravene congressional policies em-6
bodied in statutes, at least in domestic contexts such as regulation.1
This principle of congressional supremacy does not, however, tell us
how to resolve disputes over power in the interstices between clear
statutory commands.
In these situations presidents use executive orders to implement
their directives to the bureaucracy, relying on any combination of
constitutional and statutory authority that is thought to be available. 17 Thus, these orders often dwell in a zone of twilight, where
authority is neither clearly present nor absent.' 8 Although interstitial, the programs involved may prove surprisingly durable. Two
prominent examples are orders promoting civil rights in government-related activities and orders seeking economic stabilization. 19
The principle of congressional supremacy also does not tell us
how to approach statutes that directly address the power of the constitutional branches. For these separation of powers controversies,
the courts employ varying analytic approaches. There are two main
competitors, with contrasting implications for the outcome. The
Court has often used a formalistic approach that reasons logically
from the constitutional text and the Framers' acknowledged purpose to create three independent branches with distinct functions.
These cases tend to draw bright lines between the responsibilities of
the branches. In recent years, three landmark formalist decisions
have produced victories for the executive. In Buckley v. Valeo, 20 the
Court refused to allow Congress to appoint executive officers. In
15. See generally Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in DeterminingIncidntalPowers of the
President and of the FederalCourts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of "The Sweeping Clause,"
36 OHIO ST. L.J. 788 (1975).
16. The Supreme Court held early on that executive officers must obey statutory
directives. Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 612-14 (1838).
That proposition is no longer in doubt, absent a challenge by the executive to the constitutionality of the statute. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588
(1952) (holding that the President's seizure of steel mills was illegal because it was forbidden by statute).
17. See generally Levinson, PresidentialSelf-Regulation Through Rulemaking: Comparative
Comments on Structuringthe Chief Executive's ConstitutionalPowers, 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
695, 710-12 (1976) (reviewing the President's power to issue rule-like statements); Kennan, Executive Orders: A Brief History of Their Use and the President's Power to Issue
Them, reprinted in SENATE SPECIAL COMM, ON NAT'L EMERGENCIES AND DELEGATED EMERGENCY POWERS, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., EXECUTIVE ORDERS IN TIMES OF WAR AND NATIONAL EMERGENCY 20 (Comm. Print 1974); Comment, PresidentialLegislation by Executive
Order, 37 U. COLO. L. REV. 105 (1964) (examining the executive order and its use by the
President). For a compilation of many important executive orders, see OFFICE OF THE
FEDERAL REGISTER, NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMIN., CODIFICATION OF PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATIONS AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS: JANUARY 20, 1961-JANUARY 20, 1985

(1985).
18. See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-40
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (explaining the various situations in which a President
may act).
19. See Fleishman & Aufses, Law and Orders: The Problem of PresidentialLegislation, 40
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1976); AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, 789-96 (D.C. Cir.)
(en banc), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979).

20. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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INS v. Chadha,2 1 the Court invalidated the legislative veto, by which
Congress had sought to override executive action by means less formal than legislation. And in Bowsher v. Synar,2 2 the Court forbade an
officer removable by Congress to perform executive functions.
The competing approach is a functional one that assesses the
needs of each branch for protection of its "core" constitutional
functions. These cases stress the Framers' inclusion of checks and
balances, shared powers that aid the overall strategy of controlling
each branch and ultimately the government as a whole. Examples
include United States v. Nixon, 23 recognizing a limited executive privilege, and Nixon v. Adminstrator of General Services,2 4 upholding congressional authority to regulate presidential papers. Functional
analysis favors complex arrangements blending the powers of the
branches; formalism tends to condemn them.
The Supreme Court has explained that formalism is appropriate
for cases presenting a threat that one branch will aggrandize itself at
the expense of another. 25 There, "good fences make good neighbors." When the Court perceives no sign of aggrandizement, it em27
ploys the looser, functional approach. 26 Thus, in Morrison v. Olson,
the Court upheld provisions of the Ethics in Government Act 28 that
provide for court-appointed independent counsel to investigate and
prosecute high-level executive branch officials who are accused of
serious federal crimes.
The Morrison Court upheld a statutory provision allowing removal
of independent counsel for "good cause," rejecting arguments that
everyone performing executive functions, or at least all prosecutors,
must be removable at the will of the President to protect his responsibilities under Article 1.29 The Court then worked an explicit
change in the law that will spark widespread argument and speculation about Morrison's significance. Buckley, Chadha, and Bowsher had
left many observers questioning the continued vitality of Humphrey's
21. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
22. 478 U.S. 714 (1986); see Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 Sup. CT. REV. 41;
Verkuil, The Status of Independent Agencies After Bowsher v. Synar, 1986 DUKE LJ. 779. See
generally Symposium, Bowsher v. Synar, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 421 (1987).
23. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).

24. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
25. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 856-57 (1986).
The Court stated that "[ujnlike Bowsher, this case raises no question of the aggrandizement of congressional power at the expense of a coordinate branch. Instead, the separation of powers question presented in this litgation is whether Congress impermissibly
undermined, without appreciable expansion of its own power, the role of the Judicial
Branch." Id.
26. See Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 659-60 (1989) (upholding functions of the U.S. Sentencing Commission against a separation of powers challenge).
27. 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
28. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 49, 591-99 (West 1973 & Supp. 1988).
29. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2608-11, 2622.
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Executor v. United States.30 That case upheld a "good cause" provision restricting the removal of Federal Trade Commissioners and,
in dicta, gave independent agencies such as the FTC broad immunity from presidential supervision. Humphrey's Executor said, however, that the President could remove "purely executive" officers
(whoever they are) at will.31

This portion of the opinion squelched recent Justice Department
arguments that independent agencies cannot constitutionally operate free of plenary presidential removal power.3 2 Still, the Court
called for an ad hoc inquiry into the relationship between a particular function and presidential supervisory needs. Moreover, the
Court stressed that the independent counsel is not a policymaker in
the broad sense, in contrast to agencies like the FTC and the Federal Reserve Board. 3 3 Some independent functions may fall prey to
the new balancing test.
It would be a mistake, however, to read Morrison as a case that
settles much beyond its context. The Court's formalist opinions,
drawing bright lines between the branches, promote political accountability by clarifying the responsibility of executive officers for
the choices they make in administering statutes. 34 When accountability cannot be expected to produce sound decisions, as in the situations covered by the Ethics in Government Act, it should be
permissible to qualify executive authority.3 5 Thus, Morrison appro-

priately endorsed congressional power to remedy special problems
30. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
31. Id. at 610. In Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), the Court held that
Congress could not condition presidential removal of an officer on the Senate's advice
and consent. The Court would not allow Congress to expand the Senate's role beyond
its explicit authorization to review appointments. The Court's formalist rationale was
that no branch should have implied powers to participate in functions constitutionally
assigned to another; because removal was an executive function, the Senate could not
share it. The Court concluded that Article II granted the President an illimitable power
to remove those executive officials whom he had appointed. Humphrey's Executor limited
the application of Myers to "purely executive" officers.
32. See, e.g., Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 760-61 (WhiteJ., dissenting).
33. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2619.
34. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Bruff, On the ConstitutionalStatus of the Administrative Agencies, 36 AM. U.L. REv. 491, 503-06 (1987). In Sierra
Club, the D.C. Circuit stated that it recognized
the basic need of the President and his White House staff to monitor the
consistency of executive agency regulations with Administration policy. He
and his White House advisers surely must be briefed fully and frequently
about rules in the making, and their contributions to policymaking considered. The executive power under our Constitution, after all, is not sharedit rests exclusively with the President. The idea of a "plural executive," or a
President with a council of state, was considered and rejected by the Constitutional Convention. Instead the Founders chose to risk the potential for
tyranny inherent in placing power in one person, in order to gain the advantages of accountability fixed on a single source. To ensure the President's
control and supervision over the Executive Branch, the Constitution-and
its judicial gloss-vests him with the powers of appointment and removal,
the power to demand written opinions from executive officers, and the right
to invoke executive privilege to protect consultative privacy.
657 F.2d at 405 (footnotes omitted).
35. See Bruff, Independent Counsel and the Constitution, 24 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 539, 54849 (1988).
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in prosecuting senior executives. It is not a broad warrant for shearing the President of control over other executive functions.
Although uncertainty still surrounds the constitutional status of
the agencies and their amenability to presidential supervision, some
generalizations can be ventured. Under the "Opinions" Clause, 36 a
President may require executive officers to report their views on any
policy issues that the President deems important. In return, the
President may communicate his own policy views, or those of his
chosen subordinates, to agencies and may expect these views to be
honored within the limits of discretion conferred by statute. In case
of disagreement, however, the President may not simply render a
decision himself when Congress has vested such authority in another officer.3 7 Instead, the President's remedy is to remove the officer, within statutory limits on
that power, in hopes of finding a
38
more compatible replacement.
These principles reveal an enduring tension between presidential
supervision of execution and congressional supremacy over legislation.3 9 They provide only a framework for addressing, and not a
formula for answering, the hard questions that attend the actual administration of government. For example, what if presidential oversight is faithful to the letter of statutes, but appears to violate their
36. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
37. The President and Accounting Officers, 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 624, 625 (1823).
38. TheJewels of the Princess of Orange, 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 482, 489 (1831).
39. In Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), ChiefJustice Taft captured these
tensions in a single pregnant passage:
The ordinary duties of officers prescribed by statute come under the general
administrative control of the President by virtue of the general grant to him
of the executive power, and he may properly supervise and guide their construction of the statutes under which they act in order to secure that unitary
and uniform execution of the laws which Article II of the Constitution evidently contemplated in vesting general executive power in the President
alone. Laws are often passed with specific provision for the adoption of regulations by a department or bureau head to make the law workable and effective. The ability and judgment manifested by the official thus empowered, as
well as his energy and stimulation of his subordinates, are subjects which the
President must consider and supervise in his administrative control. Finding
such officers to be negligent and inefficient, the President should have the
power to remove them. Of course there may be duties so peculiarly and
specifically committed to the discretion of a particular officer as to raise a
question whether the President may overrule or revise the officer's interpretation of his statutory duty in a particular instance. Then there may be duties of a quasi-judicial character imposed on executive officers and members
of executive tribunals whose decisions after hearing affect interests of individuals, the discharge of which the President can not in a particular case
properly influence or control. But even in such a case he may consider the
decision after its rendition as a reason for removing the officer, on the
ground that the discretion regularly entrusted to that officer by statute has
not been on the whole intelligently or wisely exercised. Otherwise he does
not discharge his own constitutional duty of seeing that the laws be faithfully
executed.
Id. at 135.
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spirit? On the other hand, should restrictions on removal of officers
be read to forbid kinds of oversight that otherwise would be permissible? I address these and other issues below. In doing so, I begin
with the premise that each of the two branches has a serious claim to
the oversight of administration,
and that accommodation should be
40
sought wherever possible.
I.

The Need for Executive Management of Rulemaking

Any appraisal of regulatory oversight must address two broad
questions at the outset. First, what goals should oversight try to
achieve? Second, which branches of government are suited to pursue each goal? Answering these questions separately helps to clarify
issues of technique. For example, we should not belabor a branch
for failing to achieve something that is beyond the present capacities
of government generally.
The broadest possible role for oversight is "macromanagement," coordinating national policy on the grand scale. That is a
highly complex task, and a central responsibility of government.
Nevertheless, there are limits to the amount of coordination that
any government can perform. The information necessary to make
coherent centralized decisions about society as a whole simply does
not exist, as the Soviets so consistently demonstrate. 4 ' Instead, we
must seek "second best" levels of coordination that are geared to
actually available knowledge.
A more limited goal is "micromanagement," which addresses regulation on a case-by-case basis. This kind of oversight can strive to
conform individual rules to a set of general principles, such as economic efficiency or distributional equity. More modestly, it can remain within the compass set by the regulator, and ask only such
questions as whether the rationale for the rule is sensible and
whether factual support is present.
A vigorous call for macromanagement of rulemaking was made by
the American Bar Association's Commission on Law and the Economy, to improve policy coordination and to avoid unnecessary cost,
duplication, and conflict:
Our government has adopted a wide variety of national goals.
Many of these goals-checking inflation, spurring economic
growth, reducing unemployment, protecting our national security, assuring equal opportunity, increasing social security, cleaning up the environment, improving energy sufficiency-conflict
with one another, and all of them compete for the same resources.
One of the central tasks of modern democratic government is to
40, There is much wisdom in Professor Freund's observation that -[i]n the eighteenth-century Newtonian universe that is the Constitution, an excessive force in one
direction is apt to produce a corresponding counterforce." Freund, Foreword: On Presidential Privilege, 88 HARV. L. REV. 13, 20 (1974).
41. See, e.g., T. SOWELL, KNOWLEDGE AND DECISIONs 41-42 (1980) (emphasizing the
advantages of decentralized markets in allocating resources efficiently due to the difficulty of assembling the same information centrally).
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make wise balancing choices among courses of action that pursue
one or more of these conflicting and competing objectives.
While Congress establishes the goals, it cannot legislate the details of every action taken in pursuit of each goal, or make the
balancing choices that each such decision requires. It has therefore delegated this task to the regulatory agencies. But it has
given each of the regulatory agencies one set of primary goals,
with only limited responsibility for balancing a proposed action in
pursuit of the agency's own goals against adverse impacts on the
pursuit of other goals. For most of these agencies, no effective
mechanisms exist for coordinating the decisions of one agency
with those of other agencies, or conforming them to the balancing
judgments of elected generalists, such as the President and Congress. Appointed rather than elected, specialist rather than
generalist, regulatory agency officials enjoy an independence from
the political process-and from one another-that weakens the
national ability to make balancing choices, or to hold anyone po42
litically accountable when choices are made badly or not at all.
To illustrate the problem, the Commission noted that, as of 1979,
at least sixteen federal agencies bore regulatory responsibilities that
directly affected the price and supply of energy. 43 This diffusion of
policymaking authority had persisted despite the earlier consolidation of several energy-oriented agencies into a Department of Energy. Similar multiplicity problems presented themselves with
respect to antitrust, equal employment, industrial safety, and natural resources policymaking. From this, the Commission concluded:
Congress cannot perform these [balancing] tasks by legislating
the details of one regulation after another; that is why Congress
delegated rulemaking power to the agencies in the first place, and
gave them a wide degree of discretion as to the content of the
rules to be issued. The President is the elected official most capable of making the needed balancing decisions as critical issues
arise, while the most appropriate and effective role for Congress is
to review and, where necessary, to curb unwise presidential
44
intervention.
The Commission did not clearly separate the question of the extent of feasible policy coordination by our government from the
question of comparative institutional capacities to perform it. Perhaps for that reason, there is a considerable gap between the broad
scope of the macromanagement problem the Commission perceived
and its recommendations, which tended toward microman45
agement.
42.
REFORM

COMMISSION ON LAW AND THE ECONOMY,

68 (1979) [hereinafter

ABA,

FEDERAL REGULATION: ROADS TO

ROADS TO REFORM].

43. Id. at 70.

44. Id. at 73 (footnote omitted).
45. The Commission recommended interagency review of regulatory analyses
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Most questions of macromanagement of regulatory policy can be
settled only by Congress, through legislation, and even then quite
imperfectly. 4 6 For example, such tasks as the consolidation of scattered functions into the Department of Energy require legislation,
but do not eliminate problems of coordinating policy. 4 7 The executive can play a role, however, analogous to its role in the budget
process-one of gathering and organizing proposals for congressional consideration. In contrast, most questions of micromanagement are better suited to the executive branch, which has the more
direct power to order or influence particular regulatory actions.
Still, congressional oversight can play a role in probing regulatory
decisions and seeking information for statutory overhaul.
For several reasons, oversight by both branches tends to favor
micromanagement. First, there is the intimidating prospect of assembling the information necessary to any serious effort at largescale coordination. Second, legislative change is time-consuming
and difficult-as the Framers intended it to be. Third, the imperatives of electoral politics tend to force both branches to focus on
short-run solutions to problems. Thus, it seems both easier and
more profitable to leave cosmic issues and statutory revision for another day, and to concentrate on pending regulations.
Congress is not well suited to coordinate policy, whether the goal
be macromanagement or the application of consistent principles to
particular contexts. The reasons for this lie in its decentralization,
which stems partly from Congress's institutional nature and partly
from its current organization. Congress is a collectivity of 535 separately elected individuals. The self-interest created by its fragmented political bases sets distinct limits on the amount of
centralization the institution will tolerate. 48

Congress is naturally

prepared by rulemakers, and, more controversially, legislation granting the President
the ability to direct agencies to decide a limited number of "critical" regulatory issues
and to order changes in their decisions. See id. at 68-91; see also Cutler &Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84 YALE L.J. 1395 (1975) (urging an enhanced presidential
role in coordinating regulation).
46. For a defense of congressional prerogative and performance, in sharp contrast
to the ABA Commission's views, see SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 95TH
CONG., IST SESS., STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, pt. 5, at 6-7, 67-81 (Comm. Print
1977) [hereinafter FEDERAL REGULATION].
47. Congress has often authorized the President to prepare government reorganization plans which, within certain limits, may transfer, consolidate, or abolish agency functions. 5 U.S.C. §§ 901-912 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The current statute forbids
abolishing or transferring all the functions of an executive department or independent
regulatory agency. Id. § 905 (Supp. IV 1986). Congress's desire to keep close control
over reorganization authority is based on its recognition that the placement of a function
in one agency rather than another can have important effects on substantive policy. See
generally Karl, Executive Reorganizationand PresidentialPower, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 1 (noting
that Congress has increasingly placed emphasis on its role as overseer of the executive
branch, and has only grudgingly and reluctantly granted the power of reorganization).
For many years, Congress subjected presidential reorganization plans to legislative veto.
In 1984, Congress amended the statute to require the plans to be approved by joint
resolution. 5 U.S.C. §§ 908-912 (Supp. IV 1986).
48. See Fiorina, CongressionalControl of the Bureaucracy: A Mismatch of Incentives and Capabilities, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 332-46 (L. Dodd & B. Oppenheimer 2d ed. 1981).
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nonhierarchical; its characteristic process is one of bargaining. 4 9
Although little will be accomplished without some delegations of
authority to make the decisions on which the fate of legislation rests,
concentrated power threatens the members' capacity to serve their
own constituents and tends to be resisted.
The centrifugal and centripetal forces within Congress are in constant tension and evolution. 50 In recent years, both Houses of Congress have markedly decentralized. 5 ' A central goal-the opening
of policymaking to more diverse influences-has been achieved, but
at substantial cost to both the capacity to legislate and the consistency of oversight. The story is one of overreaction to perceived
abuses. By the early 1970s, power in Congress was widely perceived
to be overly centralized. 52 A series of reforms produced today's
congressional structure. 53 In the House of Representatives, under
the aptly named "subcommittee bill of rights," a majority of a committee (instead of the chairman) now determines the number and
jurisdiction of subcommittees. 54 In the Senate, informal assurances
to each Senator of at least one good committee assignment have
55
resulted in a subcommittee chair for most majority Senators.
Because a subcommittee chair provides a platform for political advancement, committee members have an incentive to create many
subcommittees. 5 6 Not surprisingly, subcommittees have proliferated; the number in the House rose by a third between 1971 and
49. Davidson, The CongressionalBudget: How Much Change? How Much Reform?, in CON-

153, 158 (W. Wander, F. Herbert & G. Copeland ed. 1984).
50. See generally HOUSE COMM. ON RULES, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., A HISTORY OF THE

GRESSIONAL BUDGETING

COMMrITEE ON RULES (Comm. Print 1983) (providing a history of varying degrees of

centralization within the House).

51. See generally A.

MAASS, CONGRESS AND THE COMMON GOOD 54-63 (1983).
52. A few powerful committees-and especially their chairmen, selected on the basis
of seniority-controlled the congressional agenda in ways that caused other members to
feel disenfranchised. The chairmen dominated the committees through their power to
control the agenda, the staff, and the existence and composition of subcommittees.
Davidson, Subcommittee Government: New Channelsfor Poliy Making, in THE NEW CONGRESS
104 (T. Mann & N. Ornstein ed. 1981).
53. Two related developments led to reform. First, the chairmen seemed increasingly out of touch with majority views in Congress and the nation. For example, the
bottling up of civil rights legislation throughout much of the 1950s and 1960s exacerbated frustration with the seniority system. Second, the composition of Congress was
changing. Increased turnover made the membership of both houses markedly more junior. Mann, Elections and Change in Congress, in THE NEW CONGRESS, supra note 52, at 37.
New members not planning to spend a lifetime in Congress were unwilling to serve an
extended apprenticeship before assuming power. Id.
54. Davidson, supra note 52, at 108. Also, there are limits to the number of chairmanships anyone can hold; previously, one person could chair multiple subcommittees.
Id.
55. Malbin, Delegation, Deliberation, and the New Role of Congressional Staff, in THE NEW
CONGRESS, supra note 52, at 140.
56. M. FIORINA, CONGRESS, KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT 62-67
(1977).
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1981. 5 7 The shift of power to the subcommittees has been real: the
committees often ratify their action, and have not coordinated subcommittee action firmly. 58 Increasing the number of semiautonomous subunits necessarily makes it more difficult for the chamber to
control its procedures. 59 Policy coordination, which is difficult
60
enough for a body with a very crowded agenda, suffers.
Recent congressional studies of the committee system have recommended reducing their number and broadening their jurisdiction.6 1 These reforms have languished due to the reluctance of
those controlling the present committees and subcommittees to
give up their power. In the meantime, the fragmentation of oversight is sometimes extreme. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency reports to thirty-four Senate and fifty-six House
committees and subcommittees.6 2 So conducted, congressional
oversight cannot hope to send an agency consistent signals about
63
policy.
Even if Congress does succeed in improving its own capacities for
coordinating policy, much latitude-and need-will remain for the
executive to act interstitially under the mass of statutes as they exist
at any given time. One primary impetus for such activity is the likelihood of a disparity between theories of regulation held by the administration and the existing body of statutes and regulations. The
ebb and flow of federal regulation has been considerable in recent
decades. The 1970s witnessed a surge of new "social" regulatory
statutes promoting health and safety in broad sectors of the economy. 64 These programs encountered complexities unknown to the
older "economic" regulation that controlled entry and pricing in
certain industries.6 5 We entered an "age of rulemaking" and began
developing administrative law to control the new programs.6 6 By
the end of the 1970s, however, a movement toward deregulation
was evident. Long-simmering dissatisfaction with the inefficiencies
57. A. MAAss, supra note 51, at 62; Davidson, supra note 52, at 109. A concomitant
increase in congressional staff has occurred, mostly in the subcommittees. Malbin, supra
note 55, at 140-42.
58. A. MAASS, supra note 51, at 62-63.
59. The difficulty of legislating has risen: even if the committees usually ratify subcommittee action, legislation is still at peril at both stages of consideration.
60. Ornstein, The House and the Senate in a New Congress, in THE NEW CONGRESS, supra
note 52, at 379.
61. See, e.g., HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON COMMITTEES, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., LIMITATIONS ON THE NUMBER OF SUBCOMMITTEES AND SUBCOMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS (Comm.
Print 1980).
62. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, PANEL ON CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT OF REGULATORY AGENCIES, DRAFT REPORT 39 (1988). The Panel is considering a number of recommendations to Congress to make oversight more systematic, such

as the adoption of an overall agenda for the review of statutory authorities. Id. at 85-86.
63. See Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEX. L. REV. 207, 22933 (1984).
64. See generally Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV.
1189, 1278-95 (1986) (discussing the development of federal regulation of health and
safety).

65. C.

SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST

9-12 (1977).

66. For the quoted phrase and the temper of the times, see Wright, The Courts and the

Rulemaking Process: The Limits ofJudicial Review, 59

544

CORNELL

L.

REV.

375, 375 (1974).
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of traditional economic regulation provided an early impetus. 67 But
there was also substantial reaction against the stringent new programs of social regulation because they created large redistributions
and had inefficiencies of their own. 68 By the early 1980s a period of
experimentation with deregulation had borne fruit in such industries as airlines and banking. Then, to bring the story full circle,
calls for "reregulation" followed as the costs of deregulation became evident. Today, there remain widely perceived needs to reconsider statutory policies. 69 Meanwhile, there is pressure to
update policy to the extent that statutes permit.
Although some substantive statutory overhaul has resulted, most
of the important developments have been more informal or indirect. 70 All three branches of the government have recently tried to
improve their capacity to control administration within the parameters of existing statutes. Congress has experimented with various
techniques to improve its oversight of the mushrooming bureaucracy. 7 ' The courts have developed new doctrines to provide closer
review of both the substance and procedure of agency action. 72 And
soon after enactment of the first major group of health and safety
the first attempts at exstatutes, the Nixon administration 7initiated
3
ecutive management of regulation.
Executive oversight should not be designed to transfer statutory
discretion from the agencies into the White House. The President's
bureaucracy lacks the institutional capacity to take on such responsibilities; indeed, we require the full existing resources of the agencies
to discharge them. Nor would Congress be likely to ratify such a
transfer. Instead, there is a place for micromanagement: probing
the agency's fact and policy judgments and ensuring that the agency
67. See, e.g., FEDERAL REGULATION, supra note 46, pt. 6 app. (1978) (providing case
studies considering federal regulatory activities in ten major areas of the national
economy).
68. See B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 79-94 (1981) (describing the effects of social regulation concerning air quality); Lilley & Miller, The New "Social
Regulation, "PUB. INTEREST, Spring 1977, at 49 (discussing economic and social problems
presented by the "new social regulation" of the 1970s).
69. Calls for reform have come from authors representing a wide political spectrum.
See, e.g., S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITs REFORM (1982); G. EADS & M. Fix, RELIEF OR
REFORM? REAGAN'S REGULATORY DILEMMA (1984); M. WEIDENBAUM & R. PENOYER, THE
NEXT STEP IN REGULATORY REFORM: UPDATING THE STATUTES (1983); Lilley & Miller,

supra note 68.
70. See generally Strauss, Regulatory Reform in a Time of Transition, 15 SUFFOLK U.L. REV.
903 (1981) (explaining the types of federal regulatory reform and exploring the potential changes in the 1980s).
71. See generally the valuable six-volume overview by the Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs, FEDERAL REGULATION, supra note 46 (1977-78).
72. Rabin, supra note 64, at 1295-1315; Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C.
Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 Sup. CT. REV. 345, 359.
73. See infra text accompanying notes 80-81.
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considers factors of general importance to the President's policies,
to the extent permitted by law.
Congress has recognized both the need for coordination of government policy and the President's unique capacity to provide it. A
number of statutes confer managerial authority on the President.
Their existence feeds the current debate over the President's power
to control executive policymaking in statutory interstices. They also
serve to show how Congress can go about creating and confining
executive coordinating powers.
Since enactment of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921,74 the
President has been responsible for compiling the yearly budget for
the federal government and submitting it to Congress for consideration. In general, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) controls both the budgetary and the legislative requests of federal
agencies, including the independent agencies. 75 As a practical matter, OMB derives considerable leverage from this power of review.
Congress has occasionally granted federal
agencies an exception
76
from one or both requirements, however.
OMB also has power to control the agencies' demands for information from the public, under the Paperwork Reduction Act of
1980. 77 The independent agencies may overrule OMB directives
under this statute by majority vote. 78 The component of OMB that
administers the Paperwork Reduction Act, the Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs, also 79administers the President's program for
coordinating policymaking.
III.

The Evolution of PresidentialManagement Programs

The first executive oversight program for rulemaking was the
Nixon administration's "Quality of Life" review.8 0 This program
was announced as an interagency review of proposed regulations
dealing with environmental quality, consumer protection, and other
aspects of public health and safety. In practice the Quality of Life
74. Ch. 18, 42 Stat. 20 (codified in scattered sections of title 35 U.S.C.).
75. For the origin and evolution of OMB's functions, see S. WAYNE, THE LEGISLATIVE PRESIDENCY (1978), and L. BERMAN, THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET AND
THE PRESIDENCY, 1921-1979 (1979).
76. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2076(k)(2) (1982) (Consumer Product Safety Commission).
The procedures for submittal and clearance of agency requests are set forth in OMB
Circular A-19 (rev. 1979).
77. Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (codified in scattered sections of titles 5, 20,
30, 42, and 44 U.S.C.).
78. 44 U.S.C. § 3507(c) (1982).
79. Stormy relations between OIRA and Congress due to the executive orders have
led Congress to subject the head of the office to advice and consent. Continuing Appropriations, FY 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-591, 100 Stat. 3341 (1986). For OIRA's early history,
see O'Reilly, Who's On First? The Role of the Office of Managementand Budget in FederalInformation Poliy, 10J. LEGIS. 95, 111-15 (1983).
80. The Quality of Life program began in June, 1971. It is discussed inJ. QUARLES,
CLEANING Up AMERICA: AN INSIDER'S VIEW OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
117-42 (1976); see also Executive Branch Review of Environmental Regulations: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Environmental Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 60, 61 (1979) [hereinafter Environmental Hearings] (statement of
John Quarles, former Deputy Administrator, EPA).
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review program focused almost exclusively on regulations of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). EPA's summary of a new
rule and its possible alternatives were sent to reviewing agencies
(such as the Council on Wage & Price Stability), which had four
weeks to comment, unless OMB extended the time.8 1 The OMB
staff integrated the comments and criticisms and transmitted them
to EPA. The process sometimes prolonged rulemaking for many
months. Quality of Life review brought outside views of regulatory
costs and alternatives to EPA, with some effects on its
82
policymaking.
President Ford's Inflation Impact Statement program focused on
the fiscal impact of regulations. By Executive Order No. 11,821, he
authorized OMB to promulgate criteria for agencies to use in determining which proposals were "major" in their effects upon the overall economy. 83 Agencies' rulemaking staffs then prepared Inflation
Impact Statements outlining the costs of the rules and furnished
them to OMB. 8 4 It soon became clear, however, that a decentralized process that left the primary responsibility for impact assessment to the agencies would not affect policy choices as much as
would external review. Charges were made that the Inflation Impact Statements were post-hoc justifications for decisions already
reached rather than actual restraints on the excessive inflationary
cost of rules.8 5
In 1978, President Carter issued Executive Order No. 12,044 requiring detailed regulatory analyses of proposed agency rules and
81. SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, FEDERAL REGULATION AND FEDERAL REGULATORY RE-

FORM, H.R. Doc. No. 134, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 506 (1976).
82. For an example of a major EPA regulation that was affected by the review program, see Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (upholding a regulation

reducing gasoline lead content that was affected by interagency review), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 941 (1976). In early 1977, the incoming Carter administration terminated the program. See Environmental Hearings, supra note 80, at 63-66.
83. Exec. Order No. 11,821, 3A C.F.R. 926 (1974), modified by Exec. Order No.
11,949, 3 C.F.R. 161 (1976).
84. OMB instructed agencies to include in the evaluation submitted "an analysis of

the principal cost or other inflationary effects of the action[,] . . . a comparison of the
benefits to be derived from the proposed action with the estimated costs and inflationary
impacts, and ... a review of alternatives to the proposed action that were considered."
Evaluation of the Inflationary Impact of Major Proposals for Legislation and for the
Promulgation of Regulations or Rules, OMB Circular No. A-107 (Jan. 28, 1975) (rescinded by Memorandum to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Subject:
Rescinding OMB Circulars A-85 and A-107 (Oct. 20, 1978)).
85. O'Reilly & Brown, In Search of Excellence: A Prescriptionfor the Future of 0MB Oversight of Rules, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 421, 427 (1987).
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review by the Executive Office of the President. 86 OMB subsequently issued guidance to the agencies on how to perform a regulatory analysis. 8 7 President Carter then created the Regulatory
Analysis Review Group (RARG), composed of representatives from
the principal economic and regulatory agencies. 88 RARG's purpose
was to review a limited number of regulatory analyses having substantial economic impact. Its four-member executive committee included representatives from OMB and the Council of Economic
Advisors (CEA) as permanent members; the other two memberships
rotated every six months among the cabinet departments (excluding
State and Defense) and EPA. RARG received staff support from the
CEA and the Council on Wage and Price Stability (COWPS), and
analyzed only the most important half-dozen proposed regulations
each year. In the RARG review process, reports were drafted by the
CEA and COWPS staff, commented on and agreed to by the permanent RARG members, and issued in final form for agency
consideration.8 9
President Carter also created the Regulatory Council, a group
consisting of the heads of regulatory agencies. 90 The Council's
principal function was to develop and publish semi-annually the Calendar of FederalRegulations, which provided analytical synopses of 120
86. Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1978) (revoked by Exec. Order No.
12,291). For "major" regulations, regulatory analysis was to contain "a succinct statement of the problem; a description of the major alternative ways of dealing with the
problem that were considered by the agency; an analysis of the economic consequences
of each of these alternatives and a detailed explanation of the reasons for choosing one
alternative over the others." Id. at 154.
President Carter explained:
Regulation has a large and increasing impact on the economy. Uncertainty
about upcoming rules can reduce investment and productivity. Compliance
with regulations absorbs large amounts of the capital investments of some
industries, further restricting productivity. Inflexible rules and massive
paperwork generate extra costs that are especially burdensome for small
businesses, state and local governments, and non-profit groups. Regulations that impose needless costs add to inflation.
Our society's resources are vast, but they are not infinite. Americans are
willing to spend a fair share of those resources to achieve social goals
through regulation. Their support falls away, however, when they see needless rules, excessive costs, and duplicative paperwork. If we are to continue
our progress, we must ensure that regulation gives Americans their money's
worth.
President Carter's Regulatory Reform Message to the Congress, 1 PUB. PAPERS 492
(Mar. 26, 1979). He also ordered that regulations be as simple and clear as possible,
and that they not impose unnecessary burdens. Id.
87. Memorandum from Wayne G. Granquist, Associate OMB Director for Management and Regulatory Policy to the Heads of Departments and Agencies, Regulatory
Analysis (Nov. 21, 1978).
88. For an overview of the Carter administration's regulatory management efforts,
including RARG operations, see G. EADS & M. Fix, supra note 69, at 54-57.
89. From 1977 to 1980, in support of RARG's efforts, COWPS filed 18 reports with
8 departments and agencies. Also, during the same period, COWPS issued 180 other
reports (filings, letters, and testimony) commenting on programs and individual regulations. T. HOPKINS, T. LENARD, J. MORRALL & E. PINKSTON, A REVIEW OF THE REGULATORY INTERVENTIONS OF THE COUNCIL ON WAGE AND PRICE STABILITY: 1974-1980, at 2

(1981).
90. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Subject:
Strengthening Regulatory Management, PUB. PAPERS 1905 (Oct. 31, 1978).
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to 180 major regulations under development that were likely to
have substantial economic or public impact. The Council also assisted regulators in developing cost-effective and consistent regulations. The Council then used the Calendar to help identify
relationships among upcoming rules, and to develop coordinated
plans for dealing with any significant interjurisdictional regulatory
issues. 91 The Council also undertook numerous studies and
projects designed to improve the regulatory process.
The Ford and Carter precedents influenced the Regulatory Reform bills drafted, but never enacted, between 1978 and 1981.92
These bills foreshadowed OMB's subsequent role in the Reagan administration. The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA) within OMB was created by the Paperwork Reduction Act, a
spinoff from the regulatory reform bills. 93 The Act's more stringent
requirements for agency justification of record-keeping requirements that are imposed on the public provide a statutory basis for
OIRA to involve itself in the detail of new agency rules because the
rules frequently require submissions, reports, and surveys. This
legislation was the formal beginning of an institutional OMB structure for rulemaking oversight. Also, all of the major bills gave key
roles in oversight to OMB. The Reagan administration borrowed
from the bills in the drafting of its first executive order in the first
month after the change of administrations in 1981.
The Reagan administration's program for oversight of regulation
is the most ambitious to date. 9 4 Executive Order No. 12,291, "Federal Regulation," 95 requires executive agencies, to the extent permitted by statute, to observe cost-benefit principles in implementing
91. See Regulation Reform Act of 1979: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on AdministrativeLaw
and Governmental Relations of the House JudiciaryComm., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-270 (1979)
(testimony of OMB DirectorJames T. McIntyre, Jr., CEA Chairman Charles L. Schultze,
and EPA Administrator Douglas Costle).
92. See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE REGULATORY REFORM ACT, S.
REP. No. 284, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 70 (1981); SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS & SENATE COMM. ON THEJUDICIARY, REFORM OF FEDERAL REGULATION, S. REP. No.
1018, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 17 (1980); HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REGULATION REFORM ACT OF 1980, H. REP. No. 1393, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980). The bill
passed in the Senate, 128 CONG. REC. 5297 (1982), but died in the House. See 128
CONG. REC. 25,662-63 (1982) (statement of Representative Dingell).
93. The Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520 (1982 & Supp. IV

1986), was passed as the only part of the package of Senate Government Affairs bills to
have been relatively noncontroversial, while the regulatory reform bills stalled in that
committee. See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, PAPERWORK REDUCTION
ACT OF 1980, S. REP. No. 930, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1980) [hereinafter S. REP. No.
930]. The office was established under 44 U.S.C. § 3503 (1982).

94. See generally Shane, PresidentialRegulatory Oversight and the Separationof Powers: The
Constitutionality of Executive OrderNo. 12,291, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 1235, 1235-42 (1981); Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Separationof Powers, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 1267, 1268 (1981).
95. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note at
431-34 (1982).
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regulations. The order requires executive agencies to evaluate proposed "major rules" (those with a significant effect on the economy)
according to a prescribed "regulatory impact analysis." '9 6 The central innovations of Executive Order No. 12,291 are the mandatory
character of its substantive requirements and its system for their enforcement by OMB.
Section 2 of the order requires agencies, to the extent permitted
by law, to "adhere" to five general principles "[i]n promulgating
new regulations, reviewing existing regulations, and developing legislative proposals concerning regulation." These principles require
agencies to base administrative decisions on "adequate information
concerning the need for and consequences of proposed government
action," and to set regulatory objectives, order regulatory priorities,
and undertake regulatory action in a way that will maximize
the net
97
benefits to society when costs and benefits are compared.
Section 3 of the order requires agencies to issue preliminary and
final Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIAs) in connection with major
rules. An RIA must include statements of the anticipated costs and
benefits of the proposed rule, the anticipated incidence of those
costs and benefits, the net anticipated benefits of the regulation, and
other potentially more cost-effective regulatory possibilities, with an
explanation, if appropriate, of the legal reasons why the most costeffective means of achieving the anticipated benefits cannot be
adopted. The cost-benefit analysis mandated by the order expressly
requires the inclusion of beneficial or adverse regulatory effects that
98
cannot be quantified in monetary terms.
On their face, these provisions do not dictate particular regulatory decisions. The terms "cost" and "benefit" are not defined by
the order, and the inclusion of unquantifiable costs and benefits in
the required calculus can afford agencies significant discretion. The
section 2 principles are, however, expressly intended to require
agencies to weigh competing values in a particular way, and to be
prepared to justify regulatory decisions according to a generally
prescribed form of analysis. In this sense, section 2 is not neutrally
"procedural." The order is obviously meant to affect the substance
of regulation.
An agency must transmit each proposed major rule, together with
a preliminary RIA, to the Director of OMB sixty days prior to the
publication of any notice of proposed rulemaking. OMB then has
sixty days to review the submission, and may require the agency to
consult concerning the preliminary RIA and notice of proposed
rulemaking, and to refrain, subject to judicial or statutory deadlines,
from publishing its proposal until review is concluded. The order
provides, however, that these review powers shall not "be construed
as displacing the agencies' responsibilities delegated by law." 9 9
96. Id. § 3, 3 C.F.R. 128-30.
97. Id. § 2, 3 C.F.R. 128.

98. Id. § 3, 3 C.F.R. 128-29.
99. Id. at 130.
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Subsequently, Executive Order No. 12,498 was promulgated to
establish a "regulatory planning process."' 0 0 This order requires
the head of each executive ageiicy to send OMB a "draft regulatory
program" that describes "all significant regulatory actions" to be
undertaken within one year. OMB reviews the plan for consistency
with administration policy, and a final plan is published. Executive
Order No. 12,498 supplements the prior order by giving agency
heads and OMB more power over the early stages of the regulatory
process. This new authority reduces the capacity of agency staff
components to develop a regulatory initiative to the point that it
develops a constituency-and a life-of its own. Professors Strauss
and Sunstein elaborate this point:
[The orders respond to the] perception that agency heads are,
to an undesirable degree, the captives of their own staffs rather
than politically powerful managers of agency business. Courts
have created a number of techniques to attempt to respond to the
problem, including review to ensure that the benefits of regulation are roughly commensurate with the costs. The value of such
techniques is, however, severely diminished by institutional limits
of the courts, which are not well-equipped to calculate the costs
and benefits of regulatory initiatives and are incapable of imposing a hierarchical or coordinative structure. The orders represent
an effort to deal with the general problem of uncoordinated and
insufficiently accountable administrative decisions.
While the orders on their surface mark a major enhancement of
presidential authority, a significant element of their attractiveness
lies in their potential to expand the effective authority, accountability, and oversight capacity of the agency head. This potential is
particularly strong for Executive Order 12,498. Requiring the development of an agency regulatory plan should have the same effect on the regulatory side as requiring agency presentation of a
budget does for fiscal planning. It will provide an annual oppurtunity for the agency head to focus on the work of her agency in a
planning rather than a reactive mode, stressing broad vision and
priority setting, and involving her early enough that one may expect her to have a significant impact on options considered.
Fewer staff deals will have been cut. The requirement of early
disclosure of plans-through ventilation of alternatives (in the
case of Executive Order 12,291) and annual statement of the regulatory plan (in the case of Executive Order 12,498)-is thus a
means of ensuring that regulatory policy is set by agency heads
rather than staffs. In this respect, the two orders may be understood, not only as efforts to enhance presidential or OMB power
as against agencies, but also as a means of enhancing the agency
100. 3 C.F.R. 323 (1985). See generally Note, Presidential Policy Management of Agency
Rules Under Reagan Order 12,498, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 63 (1986) (outlining the changes in
presidential oversight of regulatory policies through Executive Order No. 12,498).
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head's effective control over her staff.10
Like the Reagan orders, any permanent regulatory management
program must address inherent tensions between political appointees and the career bureaucracy. That topic follows.
IV
A.

OMB and the Agencies: Comparative Competence and Power
Vantage Points: The Place of OMB and the Agencies in the Executive

OMB is the President's principal institutional means for supervising the federal bureaucracy. Recast from the old Bureau of the
Budget, OMB consists of a few hundred civil servants (most of them
budget officers) and a growing cadre of political appointees at the
top. Since the 1970s, OMB staffing has become increasingly political, with a sharp upsurge from nine to twenty-five Schedule C political appointees in the first Reagan term alone.' 0 2 The Reagan
administration also kept close central control over political appointments within the agencies.' 0 3 Both developments respond to the
growth of the regulatory bureaucracy since 1970. They reflect presidential efforts to control policy both by designing new functions for
OMB and by using traditional executive powers more effectively.
Budget functions have long dominated OMB, to the dismay of
some political scientists who yearn for more attention to management.10 4 In budgeting, OMB's classic stance has been the skeptical
reviewer of requests from agencies that are always wanting "too
much." Indeed, a famous theory of bureaucratic behavior holds
that the principal endeavor of agencies is to expand their budgets,5
0
in search of the power and perquisites that more money can buy. 1
Whether or not this theory fits reality, to the extent that it is accepted within OMB, it affects OMB's behavior.
Attitudes born of the budget process probably carry over to supervision of rulemaking by OIRA.10 6 True, the functions are somewhat different-no formal "regulatory budget" yet exists,
"appropriations" for which must be coaxed from Congress.
Although the direct tradeoffs between scarce federal dollars that
101.

Strauss & Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38

ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 187-88 (1986) (footnotes omitted).

102. SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
AND BUDGET INFLUENCE ON AGENCY REGULATIONS, S. REP. No. 156, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
20 (1986) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 156].
103. Pfiffner, PoliticalAppointees and CareerExecutives: The Democracy-BureaucracyNexus in
the Third Century, 47 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 57, 59 (1987). Pendleton James, Director of the
White House Personnel Office, stated: "We handled all the appointments: boards,
commissions, Schedule C's ....
[1f you are going to run the government, you've got to
control the people that come into it." Id. at 59.
104. E.g., Benda & Levine, OMB and the CentralManagementProblem: Is Another Reorganization the Answer?, 46 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 379, 379 (1986).
105. W. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 36-42 (1971).
106. See supra text accompanying note 93. There is also some functional overlap.
OMB reviews rules to ensure that fiscal year and administration budgetary goals are
achieved. This review centers on entitlements programs, such as student loans and
health care financing.
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characterize the budget process do not occur in the oversight of regulation, the perspective of anyone working in OMB is determined by
its placement at the apex of the executive branch. An office that
sees the full scope of federal regulation must be impressed by its net
burdens, and is likely to doubt that any particular rule is indispensable to national welfare. Analogies to budgeting, however, can ignore the principal differences between these functions: unlike
regulatory review, budget requests are not confined by preexisting
statutory standards, and they lead to automatic legislative resolution
07
of policy issues.'
For similar reasons of perspective, agency personnel are likely to
view OMB as institutionally overcautious about regulation. Focusing on the statutory missions committed to them, bureaucrats lack
any incentive to view their own regulations in competition with
other claims for scarce national resources.' 0 8 Therefore, any system
for central oversight of regulation will produce conflict between the
regulators and their overseers, regardless of the politics of the administration in power.
Former OMB DirectorJames C. Miller III has argued that decentralized regulation advantages control by well-organized interests. 10 9 This conclusion requires some qualification. The pressures
on agencies from all three branches of government and private interest groups foster a quite complex and not readily predictable set
of bureaucratic motivations. Traditional theories that agencies are
subject to capture by their regulated interests do not account for the
complex constituencies and expanded rights of participation that
characterize modem regulation." 0 For example, EPA encounters
107. Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 101, at 195.
108. As economist Robert Crandall has observed:
The Administrators of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration,
the Environmental Protection Agency, or the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, for example, are not expending their own budgetary
allotments when they mandate outlays by private firms on pollution or safety
devices. Their principal goal is to achieve an improvement in environmental
quality or human health and safety at a minimum political cost, not necessarily at the lowest social cost. Since few citizens can possibly know how much
alternative policies will cost them-in terms of reduced resources for
purchasing food, shelter, medical care, or general amusement-it is exceedingly unlikely that the decision which minimizes the social cost of government regulation is the one which appears politically the most prudent to the
agency Administrator.
AdministrativeProcedureAct Amendments of 1978, HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Administrative
Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 389-90
(1978).
109. Miller, Shughart & Tollison, A Note on Centralized Regulatory Review, 43 PUB.
CHOICE 83, 86 (1984); see also R. NOL, REFORMING REGULATION 40-42 (1971) (stressing
that only well-organized interests such as regulated groups have the resources to politi-

cally or legally affect regulatory agency change).
110. Robinson, The Federal Communications Commission: An Essay on Regulatory Watchdogs, 64 VA. L. REV. 169, 190-91 (1978).
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effective pressure from both industry and environmental groups.
There does seem to be a tendency to compromise among effectively
organized interest groups, which often results in service to a fairly
broad range of interests. " 'I Director Miller has argued that centralized review of regulation limits special interest influence in two
ways. First, it adds lobbying costs while potential gain remains the
same. Second, because reviewers deal with everyone, there is no
reason to expect capture by anyone.' 1 2 Again, qualification is necessary. Political appointees at OMB are naturally more responsive to
an administration's friends than to its enemies. Because the issue is
marginal gain from the presence of additional process, any group
that expects a friendlier reception from OMB than from an agency
will favor central review, and will be willing to expend resources in
hopes of influencing its outcome. This suggests that the way in
which OMB review is actually performed will determine its tendency
to reinforce or dampen special interest influence.
Executive oversight also serves separation of powers goals. Congressional oversight of regulation is constant. The President needs
to assert his own claims over the executive branch to forestall the
formation of "iron triangles" by which agencies, interest groups,
and congressional committees might otherwise gain control of regulatory policy. A President needs to be especially concerned with the
formation of alliances between agency staff who oppose his policies
and committees in a House of Congress that is organized by the
party out of power. Because congressional oversight is decentralized, it does not usually send consistent signals to agencies. Only
the executive branch, with its heirarchical organization, has the capacity to formulate a consistent set of instructions to the bureaucracy. This provides an opportunity to promote values held by the
administration, thereby maximizing the political accountability of
3
regulation. "1
B. Analysis of the Costs and Benefits of Regulation
The requirement of Executive Order No. 12,291, that agencies
perform regulatory analyses to support their rules, had two sources.
One was the similar analyses required by executive orders in previous administrations. The other was an existing need to explain the
basis for rules to survive judicial review.' 14 These developments revealed the major weakness of controlling discretion by means of formal analysis: Either the initial analyst or the reviewing entity may
I 11. See generally Bruff, supra note 63.
112. Miller, Shughart & Tollison, supra note 109, at 85.
113. See generally Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J. LAw, ECON. & ORGANIZATION 81 (1985).
114. See generally Garland, DeregulationandjudicialReview, 98 HARV. L. REV. 507 (1985)
(analyzing the development ofjudicial review of administrative action and its impact on
administrative law); Sunstein, Deregulationand the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 Sup. CT. REV.
177 (examining the use of hard-look review in administrative actions and its effect on
administrative law).
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disguise a predetermined substantive preference in the garb of considered discourse."t 5 Counteracting this weakness should be a major purpose of those who guide the activities of both analysts and
reviewers.
Executive review of regulatory analysis can promote its consistent
performance in ways that judicial review cannot, for two reasons.
First, although courts are decentralized, the executive can review all
analyses according to a single set of criteria."l 6 Second, although
courts do not attempt to require the "best" analyses,just acceptable
ones, the executive can pursue both quality and consistency in the
agencies' analytic techniques.
Executive Order No. 12,291 requires cost-benefit analysis, which
has always been controversial for several reasons.' 7 First, the uncertainty and difficulty of the process may render it especially vulnerable to manipulation in service of predetermined outcomes.
Second, it tends to be biased against regulation because the direct
costs of a rule are likely to be more visible and quantifiable than are
its benefits. 1 8 Third, cost-benefit analysis is usuall the province of
economists, whose professional orientation favors private ordering
and clashes with that of health scientists, who are more risk-averse
to possible threats to public health. 11 9
What matters most about cost-benefit analysis is the spirit in
which it is performed. One skeptic concedes that it is valuable if
used by someone "committed to the underlying goals and spirit of20a
regulatory program," but not if used to mask anti-regulatory bias.1
Its defenders point out that its stated purpose is to ask questions
21
about rules that any rational observer would address.
115. See Bruff, supra note 63, at 238-40. This weakness ofjudicial review was identified very early. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 99 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting).
For its presence in an earlier executive order program, see supra text accompanying
notes 83-85.
116. For the difficulties the courts face in imparting consistent administrative law
commands to agencies, see Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of
the Supreme Court's Limited ResourcesforJudicialReview of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
1093 (1987).
117. Compare Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN.
L. REV. 387 (1981) with Markovits, Duncan's Do Nots: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Determina-

tion of Legal Entitlements, 36
cost-benefit analysis).

STAN.

L.

REV.

1169 (1984) (refuting Kennedy's critique of

118. See McGarity, Regulatory Analysis and Regulatory Reform, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1243,

1279-83 (1987).
119. Id. at 1266.
120. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, PRESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT OF
RULEMAKING IN REGULATORY AGENCIES 44 (1987) [hereinafter NAPA REPORT] (providing
separate views of Richard Wegman). This Report, by an able panel of the National
Academy, resulted from an empirical and normative inquiry into presidential management of agency rulemaking in the Reagan administration.
121. See, e.g., Scalia, Regulatory Review and Management, REG.,Jan./Feb. 1982, at 19, 19-

20.
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Cost-benefit analysis can reveal and counteract biases that favor
excessively stringent regulation. Disputes between OMB and the
agencies have persisted concerning two analytic techniques with
strong implications for the desirable stringency of regulation. First,
agencies have pressed for the use of multiple conservative assumptions in environmental decisions, which favors strict regulation.
12 2
OMB has urged the use of discount rates for future illnesses,
which implies relaxed regulation. Similarly, OMB has pursued efficiency by pressing agencies to replace traditional "command and
control" regulations, such as engineering controls, with innovative
123
market-based strategies, such as auctions of rights to pollute.
A second, less controversial, technique is cost-effectiveness analysis. It avoids direct weighing of such imponderables as the value of
life by simply asking whether a given strategy is the cheapest means
to a posited goal. Present regulations vary greatly by this criterion.' 2 4 This technique's use can help to equalize burdens of regulation, minimizing differences in costs to the economy per unit of
gain, by such measures as statistical lives saved. Much of the existing disparity in approach, however, is built into the statutes due to
their episodic enactment or because other values intrude, such as
equalizing risks to groups of workers regardless of cost
125
differences.
The role of regulatory analysis in undergirding an agency's regulations-and in informing judicial review-is shown by several examples from rulemaking by the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA). In Center for Auto Safety v. Peck, 126 the
court upheld NHTSA's relaxation of its standard for automobile
bumper crashworthiness, although the regulation altered previous
agency policy. The court relied heavily on the agency's regulatory
analysis, which comprehensively analyzed the costs and benefits of
nine alternative standards.' 2 7 NHTSA had estimated that requiring
bumpers to survive collisions at 2.5 mph would yield average net
benefits per car of $42 more than the preexisting 5 mph
28
standard.1
On the other hand, in the celebrated State Farm case, 12 9 the
122. OMB, REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: APRIL 1,
1988-MARCH 31, 1989, at 35-37 (1988) [hereinafter 1988-89 REGULATORY PROGRAM].
123. OMB has urged EPA to adopt such an approach for the protection of stratospheric ozone. See 53 Fed. Reg. 30,566 (1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 82).
124. NAPA REPORT, supra note 120, at 2, 30; see also Lilley & Miller, The New "Social
Regulation, " 47 Pu. INTEREST 49, 52-58 (1977) (concluding that the regulatory decisionmaking process is inefficient and leads to higher costs than are necessary to achieve
stated objectives).
125. See G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRUFF, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 687
(3d ed. 1986).
126. 751 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J.).
127. Id. at 1342, 1362-66; see also South Carolina ex rel. Tindal v. Block, 717 F.2d 874,
880-84 (4th Cir. 1983) (relying on regulatory analyses to uphold a rule), cert. denied, 465

U.S. 1080 (1984).
128. OMB, REGULATORY

PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: APRIL 1,
1987-MARCH 31, 1988, at xviii (1987) [hereinafter 1987-88 REGULATORY PROGRAM].
129. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
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Supreme Court held that NHTSA's rescission of its automobile pas-

sive restraint regulation was arbitrary and capricious.1 30 An otherwise comprehensive regulatory analysis had failed to consider a
major alternative to rescinding the existing standard: requiring
airbags.1t 3 Thus, requirements for persuasive analysis restrict an
agency's discretion to alter a previous policy that was itself carefully
justified.
Cost-benefit analysis has also led NHTSA to impose new regulations. In 1983, NHTSA required new automobiles to have center

high-mounted stop-lamps.' 3 2 The regulation followed field experiments with various types of stop-lamps, and reflected NHTSA's esti-

mate that the ones required would prevent 40,000 injuries and over
$400 million in property damage annually, at a cost of $70 million
per year.133
C.

The Nature of OIRA Oversight

Review of rules within OIRA is generalist in nature. It is performed by "desk officers," who are typically young economists, lawyers, or policy analysts with little prior experience in government or
with the programs they oversee. Because most review is performed
by the individual desk officers, OIRA is rather decentralized. The
consistency of desk officer review is reduced by the lack of formal
training programs or detailed written instructions on their tasks; onthe-job training is to suffice. Because OIRA reviews all rules of covered agencies, volume precludes detailed analysis of rules. Desk officers sort new rules to identify the most important, and dispose of
134
most rules quickly.
The goals of review in OIRA are based upon a recognition that,
like any other outside review, executive oversight can make regulation more reasoned by forcing articulation of the basis of proposals.
OIRA review is closely similar to the generalist "hard look" review
of the courts, which asks whether regulations are persuasively reasoned and consistent with the agency's other policies and its statute.' 35 Thus, the executive can both pursue optimal policy and
130. Id. at 40-57.
131. See McGarity, supra note 118, at 1327.
132. 48 Fed. Reg. 48,235; 48,235 (1983).
133. 1988-89 REGULATORY PROGRAM, supra note 122, at 16, 31.
134. OMB has preferred to review all rules rather than to allow agencies to apply
criteria defining rules meriting review. As a result, OMB's latest figures show that in
1987, 70.5% of the rules were approved "without change," 23.7% were approved "with
change," 2.5% were "withdrawn by agency," and 0.4% were "returned for reconsideration." Id. app. IV at 553.
135. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,4044 (1983). The NAPA REPORT, supra note 120, quotes an OIRA staff member as stating

that the goal is to obtain a "common sense," outside review of the agency's product. Id.
at 39; see alsoJ. LASH, K. GILLMAN & D. SHERIDAN, A SEASON OF SPots 24 (1984) (noting
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search out analytic errors that would otherwise cause problems in
court.
Of course, it is also possible for OIRA to introduce rather than to
remove regulatory defects. A certain amount of tinkering with rules
probably results from the efforts of desk officers to justify their own
existence.' 3 6 That effect, however, probably attends any scheme for
centralized review.
OIRA's principal officers do not expect expertise or research from
the desk officers. It would not be sensible to do so, in view of the
vastly greater expertise and resources of the agencies. For example,
EPA, with a staff of about 10,000, submits all its rules to four desk
officers in OIRA, who receive some assistance from other OIRA and
budget personnel. 137 These officers have neither the time nor the
expertise to evaluate conflicting interpretations of technical data in
a rulemaking.
In this system, tension with agency heads is automatic. Because
the agency heads typically are not technical experts in their regulatory fields, they have already provided generalized review of a regulation that they send to OMB. Moreover, they regard themselves as
cooperative in achieving the goals of the administration that appointed them. The premise of centralized review, then, is that the
judgment of the political appointees requires an outside check-that
their judgment is affected by exposure to daily pressure from career
staff, the interest groups, and congressional committees, or at least
by a natural overcommitment to the statutory mission of the
38
agency. 1
Agency officials have often called for OIRA to be more selective
in its review. 139 Thus, OMB is perceived to suffer priority problems.
Essentially, the complaint is the one so often lodged against agencies, that there is too much burdensome process and delay with too
little result. This reflects on the judgment of desk officers in selecting issues to discuss with agencies; rules that receive only cursory
that former OIRA Deputy Administrator Tozzi claimed he could "tell in about four minutes if a rule made sense").
136. S. REP. No. 156, supra note 102, at 19. The Committee Print quotes a former
EPA desk officer at OMB as stating that "[a] good desk officer does change a rule. To
make your mark, you get changes made. I felt kind of funny handing [my supervisor]
back a rule saying it was consistent [with Executive Order No. 122911." Id.
137. Id. at 18-19.
138. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The D.C. Circuit
noted:

Our form of government simply could not function effectively or rationally if
key executive policymakers were isolated from each other and from the

Chief Executive. Single mission agencies do not always have the answers to
complex regulatory problems. An overworked administrator exposed on a
24-hour basis to a dedicated but zealous staff needs to know the arguments
and ideas of policymakers in other agencies as well as in the White House.

Id. The D.C. Circuit's analysis is reminiscent of political scientist James Q. Wilson's
observation that if agencies are captured by anyone, it is by their staffs. See The Dead
Hand of Regulation, 25 PUB. INTEREST 39, 48 (1971).
139. NAPA REPORT, supra note 120, at 39.
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attention are not much delayed. Although OIRA has recently instituted a tracking process for regulations under review, 140 controversy between a desk officer and agency personnel is the typical
mechanism for bringing issues to the attention of senior officers in
OIRA and OMB. Thus, although OIRA lacks formal appeals
processes, issues percolate up through the bureaucratic chains in
the agencies and in OMB until they are resolved.
The presence of OMB's review program has led to the formation
of "mini-OMBs" in the agencies to mimic OIRA review, in hopes of
forestalling embarrassment from negative comments by OIRA.141
Some of the conflict inherent in the program then shifts into the
agencies, where the mini-OMBs (which are usually in the agency
head's office) struggle for power with the program offices. This development adds a new level of clearance and delay to the rulemaking process, unless offset by speedier OMB review.1 4 2 If the miniOMBs become a permanent feature of the government scene, OMB
might be able to shift its emphasis toward macromanagement issues
such as rationalizing statutory authorities.
At present, due to lack of resources OMB cannot provide much
coordination on issues concerning more than one agency. Some
critics consider the Carter administration's RARG 143 to have been
better adapted for in-depth review, on grounds that it provided a
mechanism for rethinking statutory schemes, for balancing major
regulations with other goals, and for aggregating experience with
regulatory analysis.' 4 4 A recent study prepared by the National
Academy of Public Administration (NAPA Report) recommends creating a regulatory analysis office for these purposes.' 45 At present,
however, OIRA does have a group of "superanalysts" review agencies' analyses, seeking improvements in the technique. And
whatever advantages the Carter administration's process may have
had in depth of inquiry were won at the cost of sharply reduced
coverage, because only a handful of regulations were reviewed each
year.
D. Bargainingin the Shadow of PresidentialPower
Executive Order No. 12,291 states that it is not to be construed as
140. Under this tracking process, a briefing book for the senior officers gives the status of significant regulations and provides an opportunity to monitor the desk officers.
141. NAPA REPORT, supra note 120, at 39.
142. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPROVED QUALITY, ADEQUATE RESOURCES,
AND CONSISTENT OVERSIGHT NEEDED IF REGULATORY ANALYSIS

COSTS OF REGULATIONS 51

IS To HELP CONTROL

(1982).

143. See supra text accompanying notes 88-89.
144. NAPA REPORT, supra note 120, at 40.
145. Id. at 41. The Report also suggests creating a parallel office within the General

Accounting Office or the Office of Technology Assessment. See id.
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"displacing the agencies' responsibilities delegated by law."' 14 6
OMB's formal power, then, is limited to "jawboning" the agencies:
arguing over proposals; delaying the issuance of regulations while
persuasion is sought; and, ultimately, placing critical comments in
the public file to which the agency must respond. How does this
work in practice? The NAPA Report concluded that "0MB arguments are more than advisory but still less than mandatory. The
review process is more one of negotiation and accommodation than
of agency initiatives being overruled by 0MB demands. Agencies
are not monolithic,14and
political appointees frequently differ with
7
career employees."'
This assessment seems generally correct, with some qualifications. The system is built for both conflict and compromise. Consider the advantages held by each of the two parties. An agency has
an initial advantage because it sets the parameters of the debate.
Still, agencies draft their rules to survive the anticipated nature of
0MB review.' 14 Thus, OMB has more pervasive influence than raw
statistics on rules altered during its review would reveal. 4 9 Summary rejection of an agency submission is rare. Negotiations usually
produce tradeoffs at the margins of the agency proposal (as, indeed,
they do in the budget process). 50 An agency also has massive advantages in the size and expertise of its staff, and can respond in
depth to any position taken by OIRA. An agency displeased by an
0MB position, while appealing within the executive branch, can
seek allies among the interest groups or in Congress.' 5 ' Finally,
agencies retain the formal authority to promulgate rules, and can do
so if they are willing to persist in opposing OIRA's point of view.
When statutory or judicial deadlines for rulemaking loom, this authority gives agencies considerable leverage with OIRA.
OMB, however, has advantages of its own. First, there is the
power of persuasion, which varies with the cogency of its positions
and the power of the individuals asserting them. Second, OMB can
use the threat of further delay to press acceptance of its views. Experience has shown this to be a powerful tool. Third, OMB can play
on the allegiance to the administration of senior political appointees
in the agency in an effort to sway them from positions generated by
146. Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 3(f)(3), 3 C.F.R. 127, 130 (1982), reprintedin 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 note at 431-34 (1982).
147. NAPA REPORT, supra note 120, at 26.
148. Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of Management and Budget Supervision of Environmental Protection Agency Reviewmaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 4 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 1, 41, 45-50 (1984).
149. See supra note 134.
150. See NAPA REPORT, supra note 120, at 27-28.
151. G. EADS & M. Fix, supra note 69, at 135 conclude:
[Case studies involving] OSHA and EPA... illustrate... the limited powers,
even under the broad Reagan executive order, that the White House actually
has to force regulatory changes on unwilling agencies if such agencies are
prepared to protest the changes all the way to the president and to leak word
of their protest to the press.
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career staff.1 52 Here too, OMB has repeatedly demonstrated its
practical power. Fourth, OMB's leverage depends on its other powers over the agencies: its budget and legislative clearance functions;
its statutory power to control requests for information from the
public; and, ultimately, its ability to request the President to remove
an uncooperative official. Given the likelihood that an agency's
budget and legislative program eclipse any particular regulation in
its priorities, this may be the most important element of OMB's bargaining power.
Much depends on the bureaucratic level that a particular controversy reaches, and on the agency's power within the administration.
No OIRA desk officer can realistically threaten to slash an agency's
budget, but the OMB Director can. A Deputy Assistant Secretary in
an agency cannot realistically threaten to appeal to the President,
but the Secretary can. As with other issues in the bureaucracy, continuing controversy over a rule tends to rise up the chain of command in both the agency and OMB until resolution is reached. Final
compromise on a relatively controversial rule will be reached among
the senior political appointees in the administration. This does not
mean, however, that OMB and the agency will be evenly matched in
the bargaining. Several of the agencies whose rules have produced
frequent controversy with OMB (EPA, FDA, and OSHA) are headed
by subcabinet administrators who lack the "clout" of the old-line
cabinet departments such as State and Treasury. With regard to the
health and safety agencies, OMB may truly be the "toughest kid on
the block," 15 3 able to impose its will if its senior officers are
15 4
persistent.
Because agency heads and senior OMB officals deal with each
other on a multitude of issues, each has a strong incentive to reach
compromise on controverted issues arising under the executive orders, rather than spend limited institutional capital on squabbling
over a particular regulation. 155 Perhaps for that reason, the ultimate
152. See G. BRYNER, BUREAUCRATIC DISCRETION: LAW AND POLICY IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES 67 (1987). Professor Bryner has noted that:

There have been few disagreements between agency heads and officials of
the regulatory review bureau in the Office of Management and Budget; the
few times that the head of OSHA or EPA have tangled with OMB reviewers
are rare, attention to ideology in appointments having assured general
agreement in executive agencies over policy concerns and priorities.
Id. (citation omitted).
153. DeregulationHQ: An Interview on the New Executive Orderwith Murray L. Weidenbaum
andJames C. Miller III, REG., MAR./APR. 1981, at 14, 22 (quotingJames C. Miller, former
head of both OIRA and OMB).
154. Of course, contests for power between agency and White House staff long predated the Reagan administration. See SUBCOMM. ON EMPLOYEE ETHICS AND UTILIZATION
OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE, PRESIDENTIAL STAFFING-A

H.R. REP. No. 17, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 59-61 (1978).
155. See Olson, supra note 148, at 45-50.
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steps of appealing to the presidential level' 5 6 or issuing a rule over
OMB's objections are rare.
In the early years of the program, EPA did issue one regulation
without OMB clearance, and received an immediate threat of retaliation. 15 7 More recently, the Department of Agriculture sent OIRA a
draft of a proposed rule deleting requirements that meat food labels
disclose the use of mechanically separated meat (MSM).s 58 Sausage
makers had petitioned for the change on grounds that consumers
would not buy products containing MSM. OIRA returned the rule
to USDA, objecting that the costs of the rescission in reducing informed market decisions would outweigh its benefits. 159 USDA
published the proposed rule anyway.' 60 In this case, OIRA could
claim the role of protector of the general public's interest against
special interest pressures, but could not claim victory.
During the eight years of the Reagan administration, the executive order program had time to evolve and mature. The next two
sections of this Article portray such a process, with early controversies leading to procedural compromise and improved regularity. A
program that had a distinctly experimental flavor in 1981 has
6
achieved tentative acceptance in the executive branch.' '
V
A.

Fidelity to Statutory Authority

Reconciling Statutory Commands with Administration Preferences:
"Regulatory Relief" in the Reagan Administration

Although the Reagan administration's regulatory management
program is constitutional on its face, its implementation has the po62
tential to transgress substantive or procedural statutory limits.
Of course, all executive activity carries the potential for straying beyond legal limits. The question concerning this particular program
is whether one of its announced purposes has placed an undue
strain on fidelity to statutory requirements. That purpose is deregulation, which, if pursued for its own sake rather than as a result of a
156. During the existence of the Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief, it received only one appeal of a proposed rule. Id. at 44.
157. EPA: Investigation of Superfund and Agency Abuses: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigationof the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
pt. 3, at 7-8 (1984) [hereinafter Superfund Hearings] (testimony of former EPA Chief of
Staff Daniel).
158. Burros, Eating Well, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1988, at C8, col. 3.
159. Letter from Jay Plager, Administrator, OIRA, to Christopher Hicks, General
Counsel, USDA (Aug. 18, 1988).
160. 53 Fed. Reg. 35,089 (1988) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pt. 317) (proposed Apr.
26, 1988).
161. M. GOODMAN & M. WRIGHTMAN, MANAGING REGULATORY REFORM: THE REAGAN
STRATEGY AND ITS IMPAcT 73 (1987) (stating that "[t]he goals have filtered down through
the bureacracy and, to a remarkable extent, they have been accepted across regulatory
agencies").
162. See generally Proposed Executive Order Entitled "Federal Regulation," 5 Op. Off.
Legal Counsel 59 (1981); Symposium, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Agency Decision-A'aking: An
Analysis of Executive Order No. 12,291, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 1195 (1981).
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careful review of regulations, can undermine compliance with stat63
utes that mandate regulation.'
Both of the executive orders that create the present regulatory
management system include among their purposes "to reduce the
burdens of existing and future regulations."' 164 Indeed, the Reagan
administration's first day saw creation of the high-visibility Task
Force on Regulatory Relief, with the Vice President as chair and
cabinet officers as members. Its final report in 1983 claimed to have
"rationalized the rulemaking process and slowed the growth of new
65
rules."
This theme has persisted. President Reagan's introduction to his
Regulatory Programfor 1988-89 stated his belief "that American life is
burdened by too much regulation and that true regulatory reform
must involve regulatory reduction."'' 6 6 The President's message
went on, however, to endorse "the development of useful regulations that will increase benefits to society as a whole," and to express confidence that his successor "will want to continue this
endeavor to serve the public interest by insisting that regulatory ac1 67
tivity be productive."
If a regulatory management program is to succeed, it must not
cause rules to be invalidated by reviewing courts. Recent Supreme
Court decisions have set the parameters for judicial review of
rulemaking. The Court has tried to achieve two somewhat inconsistent purposes: to allow political oversight to operate freely, yet to
bind final agency decisions to law. The two most important cases
illustrate the tensions.
1 68
In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
the Court considered the amount of latitude that courts should give
to agencies' interpretations of their governing statutes. It allowed
the EPA to reverse preexisting policy in favor of an approach to air
pollution that met the administration's efficiency criteria.16 9 In a departure from earlier cases, the Court called for a determination
"whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
163. A sign of deregulation for its own sake in the Reagan program is the use of
categorical waivers of OMB review for deregulatory actions, for example, relaxations of
pesticide tolerances and the deletion of listed toxic water pollutants. See OMB, REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: APRIL 1, 1985-MARCH 31, 1986,
at 581 (1985).

164. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note at
431-34 (1982); Exec. Order No. 12,248, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1986), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A.
§ 601 app. at 296-97 (West Supp. 1988).
165. OMB,

PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON REGULATORY RELIEF FINAL REPORT

(1983).

166. 1988-89 REGULATORY PROGRAM supra note 122, at vii.
167. Id. at viii.
168. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
169. Id. at 845-66. See generally Landau, Chevron, U.S.A. v. NRDC: The Supreme Court
Declines to Burst EPA's Bubble Concept, 15 ENVTL. L. 285 (1985).
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issue" in the text or legislative history of a statute. 170 If Congress
has spoken clearly, its will governs, but if the statute is "silent or
ambiguous," the agency's interpretation prevails if "reasonable."'' 7 t
The Court's rationale for endorsing the interpretive authority of
agencies emphasized political accountability; an agency may "properly rely upon the incumbent
administration's views of wise policy to
1 72
inform its judgments."'
Although controversy surrounds Chevron, it has had considerable
impact on the lower courts.' 7 3 Chevron altered prior law by denying
courts the power to decide issues of statutory interpretation that depend on the overall structure and purposes of the statute. Chevron's
1 74
critics regard that role as a traditional preserve of the judiciary.
Perhaps because of that tradition, the Court's later cases have
175
evinced some doubts about Chevron's sweep.
The Court's earlier decision in State Farm176 invalidated NHTSA's
attempt to conform its policy to administration goals by rescinding
its passive restraints regulation. One can reconcile these two cases
on the ground that in State Farm the agency insufficiently explained
the fact and policy bases of its action, whereas in Chevron the agency
passed that test. Nevertheless, by endorsing active judicial review of
an agency's support in the administrative record for any change in
the regulatory status quo, the Court slowed administrative efforts to
77
alter existing regulations.
From the outset, the Reagan administration's regulatory relief
emphasis has been difficult to reconcile with the legislative history
of some of the most stringent health and safety statutes. These statutes were passed in the early 1970s, in an era when congressional
sensitivity to the cost of regulation was low. 178 In the absence of
comprehensive reform of these statutes, which has not occurred, the
administration has struggled to accommodate its philosophy of government with statutory commands premised on a need for aggressive regulation. As Chevron and State Farm illustrate, the results in
court have been mixed.
Not surprisingly, most of the controversy that has surrounded the
170. 467 U.S. at 842.
171.

Id. at 843-44.

172. Id. at 865.
173. See generally Pierce, Chevron and Its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301 (1988) (noting that lower courts have
adopted a "strong" Chevron approach, deferring to the agency to resolve policy questions); Starr,Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283 (1986) (discussing the effect of Chevron's two-part standard ofjudicial review on lower courts).
174. E.g., Breyer,JudicialReview of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363,
381 (1986).
175. See NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 108 S.Ct. 413, 426
(1987) (Scalia,J., concurring); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 1224-25 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring). See generally Starr, Of Forest and Trees: Structuralismin the Interpretation of Statutes, 56 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 703 (1988).

176. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983);
see supra text accompanying notes 129-131.
177. See generally Garland, supra note 114; Sunstein, supra note 114.
178. See, e.g., American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981)
(OSH Act); Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976) (Clean Air Act).
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regulatory management program has centered on its relation to
these statutes. Although the real disagreement usually concerns the
substance of regulatory policy, much of the debate has occupied the
more neutral ground of procedure. 179 In other contexts, administrative lawyers are familiar with this tendency for procedural debate
to mask substantive conflict. For purposes of this Article, it creates
two difficulties. First, one needs to penetrate the substantive static
to identify real issues of procedure. Second, one needs to craft procedures that respond to the potential for tension between statutory
requisites and executive preferences.
B.

Delay, Deadlines, and BargainingPower

The NAPA Report found that the "clearest impact" of the oversight process has been to delay rulemaking; agency personnel complained about it constantly.1 80 Of course, delay is a cost of any
analytic process. Whether the cost is justified in a particular case by
improvements in the final rule is a matter of opinion. Leaving that
question aside, I will discuss three issues. First, in the Reagan oversight program, long delays have been common enough to suggest a
need to revise applicable administrative deadline and extension provisions. Second, courts have found delay illegal when it contributes
to missing statutory deadlines. And third, delay provides both OMB
and the agencies a tool to obtain the other's assent to their views.
Executive Order No. 12,291 sets short presumptive deadlines for
OMB review: 60 days for proposed major rules, 30 days for final
ones, and 10 days for all others. 18 1 Most rules are reviewed within
these general parameters-the overall figures for 1981-87 show an
average of 32 days for major rules, 18 days for others, and 19 days
for all rules. 18 2 In view of OIRA's small staff and large workload,
this record is impressive. Still, gross statistics can be misleading for
complex or controversial rules. For example, in 1985 the average
review time for major EPA rules was 78 days, and for the Department of Labor (where OSHA resides) it was 173 days. 183
179. For an example of mixed legal and policy concerns in the continuing debate,
compare Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a
Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1986) (arguing that OMB's unwarranted dominance
over agency rulemaking should be either eliminated by Congress or restricted by the
President) with DeMuth & Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 1075 (1986) (defending President Reagan's regulatory review programs).
180. NAPA REPORT, supra note 120, at 7, 37.

181. Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 3(e)(2)(A)-(C), 3 C.F.R. 129 (1982), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. § 601 note at 431-34 (1982).
182. 1988-89 REGULATORY PROGRAM, supra note 122, at 555.

183. Id. Figures compiled at EPA differ somewhat. They showed that in 1985, OMB
held major rules for over four months. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET INFLUENCE
ON AGENCY REGULATIONS, S. REP. No. 156, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1986) [hereinafter S.
REP. No. 156].
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These statistics do not reflect delay stemming from OMB-agency
negotiations that precede formulation of a proposed rule.18 4 Nor
do they reflect the time costs of internal agency review processes
that have arisen in response to the Executive Order. 8 5 Of course,
pre-proposal delay may be offset by speedier review later due to
agreement on some issues. Indeed, the Executive Order's short
presumptive periods for review provide some incentive to shift review to earlier stages of rule formation to avoid extensions. Moreover, as the very existence of Executive Order No. 12,498 reveals,
the earlier OMB review occurs, the more likely it is to be effective in
molding agency policy.
Executive Order No. 12,291 allows OMB to extend its review indefinitely, absent judicial or statutory deadlines.' 8 6 Controversial
rules have been held for periods exceeding one year. For example,
EPA submitted eleven New Source Performance Standards (NSPS)
for air pollutants to OIRA for review, between three and thirteen
months before the applicable statutory deadline for their issuance. 18 7 Negotiations then extended past the deadline for all eleven
rules, in one case by a year. This technical violation of both statutory and executive order requisites may not have seemed serious to
either EPA or OIRA because the health and safety statutes contain
many rulemaking deadlines that agencies do not meet. Nevertheless, these violations tend to produce hostile reactions in Congress.
A congressional oversight report concluded that the NSPS delay was
"caused by the need to respond to OMB's questions on cost-effectiveness and to clarify apparent misunderstandings and misinterpretations, by delayed meetings, and by simple inaction and
unresponsiveness on the part of OMB."' 18 8
Review-based delays have also encountered judicial disapproval
when they have contributed to an agency's failure to meet statutory
deadlines. In EnvironmentalDefense Fund v. Thomas, 189 a district court
considered a suit to compel EPA to comply with a statutory directive
that it promulgate rules dealing with hazardous wastes in underground storage tanks by March 1, 1985. EPA had already failed to
meet this deadline when it sent a proposed rule to OMB on March
4, 1985. The agency might have anticipated that the missed deadline would compel speedy OIRA clearance, but that was not to be.
In an April meeting, OIRA pressed EPA to alter its strategy from
containing all leaks to one of preventing leaks of wastes that risk
184. See Olson, supra note 148, at 46 (noting that "OMB was involved for over a year"
before any EPA proposal emerged on air quality standards for particulates).
185. See G. BRYNER, supra note 152, at 125 (noting that due to the organizational
complexity that has arisen within EPA, progress in the rulemaking process has been
stifled).
186. Executive Order No. 12,291 exempts rules from its process when review would
"conflict with deadlines imposed by statute or by judicial order." Exec. Order No.
12,291, § 8(a)(2), 3 C.F.R. 133 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note at 431, 434
(1982).
187. Olson, supra note 148, at 68.
188. S. REP. No. 156, supra note 183, at 31.
189. 627 F. Supp. 566 (D.D.C. 1986).
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analysis identified as health threats. After more negotiations, OMB
cleared the rule in mid-June. 190
Finding a statutory violation, the court set a new deadline for promulgation of a final rule, compliance with which was not to be prevented by OMB review.' 9 ' Judge Thomas Flannery noted that the
delay problem was not limited to this rule-interrogatories revealed
that OMB often extended its review even when statutory or judicial
deadlines were present. 1 92 Complaining that the executive order's
exemption for rules under deadline is "[aipparently ... simply ignored," he declared that 0MB
review must terminate in time to al93
low deadlines to be met.'
Especially in the presence of statutory deadlines, either OIRA or
an agency can use delay to gain leverage. A typical agency complaint occurred in an internal EPA study of the NSPS delays:
The problem is that OMB has no incentive whatsoever to keep the
process moving and no one to which they are accountable for failures of responsiveness ....
Once a dialogue has begun, OMB
tends to repeatedly find new issues each time the last issue is settled, often with long intervening delays. Often .... these issues
involve questioning the technicaljudgment of EPA r5ther
than the
94
implications of costs, benefits, and impacts to society.'
EPA is correct that the responsibility for issuing a rule (and, probably, the desire to have one at all) lies principally with the agencies
rather than OIRA. Knowledge that the agencies need new rules
more than OMB does gives OIRA leverage in any rulemaking. Still,
OIRA is accountable within OMB and the administration for its
lapses. Any tendency to bring up new issues during review can result from inefficiency in OIRA, and if so can be cured by improved
management. Also, it is not easy to identify the borderline between
technical judgment and oversight of a rule's costs and benefits.
True, even when delays are long, it is rare for agencies to seek
formal appeal of an OIRA position, or to publish a rule in the face of
its opposition. 19 5 An agency contemplating either action would fear
worsened relations with OMB and, possibly, retribution. Therefore,
delay caused by OIRA preference can put effective pressure on an
agency to accede. Moreover, this pressure arises even when delay in
190. Id. at 567-69.
191. Id. at 570-71.
192. Id. at 571.
193. Id.
194. S. REP. No. 156, supra note 183, at xvi (emphasis omitted) (quoting Emission
Standards and Eng'g Div., Off. of Air Quality Planning and Standards, Off. of Air, Noise,
and Radiation, U.S. EPA, New Source Performance Standards: Beverage Can Industry-A Case Study (Aug. 23, 1983).
195. See supra text accompanying notes 155-160; see also S. REP. No. 156, supra note
183, at 6.
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OIRA is not a negotiating tactic but a result of the volume of rules
and the small size of its staff.
In addition, OIRA has an incentive to prolong negotiations with
an agency rather than to appeal for help from higher levels in OMB
and the administration. In the absence of a formal review process
within the executive, it is unclear who may appropriately intervene
in a dispute. OIRA might reasonably fear that its own relatively
technocratic style of review will be displaced by more politically ori19 6
ented operatives on the White House staff.
In the presence of a statutory or judicial deadline, the possibility
arises for either OIRA or an agency to pressure the other in a game
of "chicken." Agencies have the formal responsibility to meet deadlines, and are therefore vulnerable to threats of delay. At the same
time, agencies can withhold their own submission to OIRA until a
deadline nears, and press for immediate review. Indeed,
if an
1 97
agency is tardy enough, it may escape review entirely.
More definite limits should be placed on the duration of OIRA
review to constrain the relatively infrequent but extended delays
that have sometimes interfered with the administration of federal
programs. Such limits would presuppose that the marginal utility of
OIRA review diminishes as time passes and as the costs of delay
increase. Reasonable minds could disagree on the optimal duration
of OMB review. One strategy would begin with the presumptive
limits in Executive Order No. 12,291, which have sufficed for most
rules. 198 OIRA would be entitled to a set number of extensions
each year, again for a fixed and final period.
Firmer administrative deadlines would inform both sides to the
dialogue of the time it will end. Of course, agencies would gain opportunities to stall, hoping to prevail through inaction. The existence of OMB's other powers over agencies, especially in budgeting,
should confine this tendency somewhat. For a more sensitive enforcement device, OIRA should be granted power to counter agency
delay by imposing deadlines for agency responses to its communications. If an agency misses the deadline, the time for OIRA review
would increase accordingly. As well, OMB could threaten to comment publicly on the rulemaking record in order to induce an
agency to respond to its views.
C. Allocating Agency Jurisdiction: Asbestos
The regulation of asbestos has produced a major controversy
over the role and limits of OMB oversight. The dispute concerned
OMB pressure on EPA to invoke its authority under section 9 of the
196. John Cooney, former Deputy General Counsel, OMB, Remarks at the meeting
of the ABA Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice, Denver, Colo. (Feb.
5, 1989).
197. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 14 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl L. Inst.) 20,817; 20,819 (D.D.C. 1984) (ordering EPA to issue a rule without OMB
review because of a violation of statutory deadlines).
198. See supra text accompanying note 181.
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Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)1 9 9 to defer to the Occupa-

tional Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Consumer
Product Safety Commission (CPSC) for asbestos regulation. Unlike
most instances of OMB oversight, this one involved a question of
coordinating20 0 action among several agencies having potential
jurisdiction.

In 1984, after five years of preparation, EPA sent OIRA two pro-

posed regulations for the control of asbestos. 20 EPA's approach
was strict-the rules would have banned four product categories
and phased down production of others. For about the next six

months, EPA and OIRA sparred over the rules. One prominent dispute concerned valuation of benefits. In accordance with its policy

of promoting consistent approaches to cost-benefit analysis, OIRA
argued that the health benefits of cancer cases avoided should be

discounted for the thirty- to forty-year latency period for asbestos-

caused cancer. 20 2 EPA resisted the discounting approach, noting its

of reducing the apparent cost-effectiveness of the
consequence
03
2

rules.
As impasse loomed, OMB began pressing EPA to invoke its section 9 authority, which authorizes it to defer to another agency with
jurisdiction over a toxic substance upon a finding that the other
agency has power to reduce the risk "to a sufficient extent." 20 4 EPA
had repeatedly rejected the adequacy of such a referral; OIRA now
argued that referral was mandatory.
In February, 1985, EPA suddenly announced that it was withdrawing its proposed rules for referral to OSHA and CPSC. The only
support for the decision was an OMB legal memorandum urging
that referral was mandatory. 20 5 Enraged EPA staff wrote an open
letter to Administrator Thomas, denouncing the deferral as "an insult to our intelligence and the public's." 20 6 Amid this internal turmoil and after a heated public controversy and hostile congressional
hearings, EPA reconsidered its decision. It issued proposed rules in
199. 15 U.S.C. § 2608 (1982).
200. Another jurisdictional dispute concerned the regulation of radioactive wastes.

See Olson, supra note 148, at 64-67. Like the asbestos controversy, it involved a sharp
clash between EPA (especially its staff) and OMB. Id.
201. The chronology for this account is drawn from EPA 's Asbestos Regulations: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Energy and Commerce Comm.,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 21-28 (1985), and the SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 99TH CONG., IST SESS., EPA's
ASBESTOS REGULATIONS: REPORT ON A CASE STUDY ON OMB INTERFERENCE IN AGENCY
RULEMAKING 1-5 (Comm. Print 1985) [hereinafter OMB INTERFERENCE REPORT].
202. OMB INTERFERENCE REPORT, supra note 201, at 25, 78-82; see supra text accompanying note 122.

203.
204.
205.
206.
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Id. at 78.
See 15 U.S.C. § 2608(a)(1) (1982).
OMB INTERFERENCE REPORT, supra note 201, at 3.
Id. at 28.
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January, 1986.207 Some months later, OSHA issued regulations
drastically reducing permissible amounts of asbestos in the
2 08
workplace.
In the asbestos controversy, an agency reversed a considered position under pressure from OIRA without any supporting analysis of
its own. OIRA swayed EPA's political appointees from a position
for which the staff had prepared extensive support that appeared in
the administrative record. The inflamed reaction of the staff to the
deferral decision reveals the intellectual and emotional investment
that agency personnel develop after years of work on a regulation.
The principal officers of an agency are responsible for its decisions,
however, and a main purpose of executive review is to ensure that
these officers fully consider administration policy. Indeed, the tenor
of the staff's reaction in this episode lends support to the perception in OMB that its review can serve to correct a tendency for
agency staff, who are devoted to a regulation, to mislead agency
heads about the facts or the law. 20 9 Still, sudden reversals of policy
encounter substantial jeopardy from courts exercising today's "hard
21 0
look" review for arbitrariness.
The notably hostile tone of congressional oversight of this episode might stem partly from a perception that OIRA engaged in
some regulatory "forum-shopping," urging EPA to defer only after
its intent to pursue stringent regulation became clear. Certainly,
OIRA may have acted upon a broader view of the appropriate allocation of jurisdiction to regulate toxic substances. If so, however,
the fact that the review process occurs after one agency's rulemaking initiative is well underway can lead to a waste of time and effort.
Instituting earlier review of an agency's program pursuant to Executive Order No. 12,498 may ameliorate this problem.
D. Constraintsof the Administrative Record: Ethylene Oxide
Ethylene oxide is a suspected carcinogen used in the sterilization
of hospital instruments. After OSHA had considered its regulation
for years, a federal court mandated issuance of a rule by June 15,
1984.211 As the deadline loomed, OSHA completed work on a final
rule, in two parts. 2 12 There was a permanent exposure limit (PEL)
of one part per million (ppm) and a short term exposure limit
(STEL) of ten ppm. OSHA's draft preamble to the final rule explained that studies had shown that the PEL alone would not reduce
cancer risks to acceptable levels; instead, it reflected the limits of
207. 51 Fed. Reg. 3738 (1986).
208. NAPA REPORT, supra note 120, at 5.
209. See Olson, supra note 148, at 62.
210. This is illustrated by the ethylene oxide case, discussed infra Part D.
211. Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150, 1154 & n.12
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
212. See H. SEIDMAN & R. GILMOUR, POLITICS, POSITION, AND POWER: FROM THE POSITIVE TO THE REGULATORY STATE 142-43 (4th ed. 1986); Brief for the Public Citizen
Health Research Group, at 1-27, Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson, 796
F.2d 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (No. 84-1252) (providing a chronology of the work on the
final rule).
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economic feasibility.2 1 3 OSHA also concluded that its STEL would
be economically feasible.
On June 13, 1984, OSHA sent the rule to OMB for review. The
next day, OIRA Administrator DeMuth responded with a detailed
letter objecting that the STEL was insufficiently supported by the
health effects data and would not be cost effective. 2 14 The speed
and cogency of this response suggest strongly that OIRA had already negotiated with OSHA concerning the shape of the final rule,
before its formal submission for review. The approach of the
court's deadline would have compelled such a process if OIRA's review was to be meaningful. The next day, OSHA forwarded its final
rule to the Federal Register. 21 5 In its haste, OSHA simply deleted
the STEL and all reference to it from the final standard, and blacked
out the portions of the draft preamble referring to support for the
STEL. Conceding that this decision was based "largely in response
to reservations expressed by the Office of Management and
Budget," OSHA then announced further rulemaking proceedings
on the issue of a STEL. 2 16 These proceedings also terminated without promulgation of a STEL.
In Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson, 2 1 7 the D.C. Circuit
upheld the permanent exposure limit, but remanded the STEL portion of the rule to the agency. Without "any evidence" in the record, OSHA now argued that the permanent limit would reduce
short-term exposure. 218 Pointing to studies in the administrative
record that suggested the contrary conclusion, the court ordered
OSHA to promulgate a STEL or explain more persuasively why it
would not. 2 19 A year later, the court declined to hold OSHA in contempt for further delays, but issued an acerbic opinion characterizing the history of ethylene oxide regulation as "one of hesitation
213. This preamble language reflected the Supreme Court's holding that "cost-benefit analysis by OSHA is not required by the [OSH Act] because feasibility analysis is."
American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 509 (1981).
214. Letter from Adminstrator Christopher DeMuth, OIRA to Solicitor Francis Lilly,
Department of Labor (June 14, 1984) (copy on file at the George Washington Law Review).
OIRA also raised questions about OSHA's compliance with Paperwork Reduction Act
requirements for clearance of its information collection provisions and about the rule's
restrictions on compliance by means other than engineering controls. Id.; see also 198788 REGULATORY PROGRAM supra note 128, at xxi (providing additional OMB criticisms of
OSHA's approach).
215. 49 Fed. Reg. 25,734 (1984).
216. Id. at 25,775.
217. 796 F.2d 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
218. Id. at 1506.
219. Id. at 1507.
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and lack of resolve," 220 and set yet another deadline for final decision. 221 OSHA finally issued a STEL regulation on April 4, 1988.222
In the regulation of ethylene oxide, as with asbestos, an agency
suddenly changed a considered position in response to OMB pressure. In both cases, the consequent problem was one of bureaucratic regularity-the agency did not take time to conform its
administrative record to the altered outcome of the rulemaking. For
asbestos regulation, in which a pure issue of law was involved, the
agency's general counsel would ordinarily provide detailed legal advice supporting referral. Although OIRA's legal position in the asbestos controversy may have been correct, OIRA and OMB do not
have the staff resources to do more than raise legal questions that
the agencies have neglected. In the ethylene oxide rulemaking,
OIRA did just that, asking OSHA how its STEL met
the Supreme
2 23
Court's requirement for a "significant risk" finding.
Bureaucratic regularity helps to ensure the legality of agency action. Hasty decisions encounterjeopardy on judicial review. Courts
search for signs that issues of fact, policy, and law have been considered carefully. The ethylene oxide case illustrates the potential for
sudden policy reversals to fail the dictates of State Farm, requiring
that agencies show they have taken a "hard look" at policy
choices. 22 4 Thus, even if acceptance of OIRA's position improved
the agency's action in each case, the need remained to ensure that
the administrative record, including the agency's statement of basis
and purpose, fully supported the final outcome. This responsibility
lies principally with the agencies, not OIRA. Because government
policymaking frequently occurs under time pressure, however, it is
important that both parties involved in the review recognize the
need to protect the administrative record. Failure to do so risks a
judicial remand that is inevitably more burdensome and disruptive
22 5
than the work needed to ensure legality in the first instance.
E. Factors Made Relevant by Statute
In Centerfor Science in the Public Interest v. Department of the Treasconsumer health group sued the Treasury Department's
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF) for rescinding
regulations designed to inform consumers, especially those with allergies, of the contents of alcoholic beverages. 22 7 In 1980, BATF
issued a final rule requiring contents labeling, or in the alternative,
ury, 2 2 6 a

220. Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Brock, 823 F.2d 626, 627 (D.C. Cir.

1987).
221. Id. at 629.
222. 53 Fed. Reg. 11,414 (1988).
223. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
224. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
(1983); see supra text accompanying notes 176-77.
225. The risk of remand is increased by judicial hostility to "post-hoc
tions" for administrative action through litigation affidavits or arguments

642 (1980).
U.S. 29, 46
rationalizaof counsel.

See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971).
226. 573 F. Supp. 1168 (D.D.C. 1983).

227. The plaintiffs sued under the Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 27 U.S.C.
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notification of the availability of a contents list from the manufacturer. 22 8 BATF had performed a Regulatory Analysis under the
Carter administration's Executive Order No. 12,044.229 The analysis reported wide variations in estimates of both the costs and benefits of the rule. In May, 1981, BATF proposed to rescind the rule,
heeding the call of the new Executive Order No. 12,291 to review
existing rules under cost-benefit criteria.23 0 Finding that the rule's
costs were not commensurate with its benefits, BATF then re23
scinded the rule. '
The district court invalidated BATF's action for two reasons.
First, it held that Congress had made an implicit cost-benefit judgment by enacting the statute, stating that Congress "did not condition [its] grant of authority with a proviso that the regulations could
be withdrawn if the costs to the industry turned out to be too
high."'2 3 2 Second, the court held that the agency had not explained
its sudden shift of policy persuasively enough; the action was arbitrary.23 3 As in the ethylene oxide case, the administrative record
compiled in support of the initial rule had not been refuted.
In striking down the alcohol labeling regulations, the court did
2 34
not defer to the agency's interpretation of its statutory duties.
The later Chevron decision shows that the court's approach, and perhaps its outcome, was wrong. Still, some statutes do preclude a
cost-benefit approach. The Alcohol Labeling Act may be one of
them.
Even if a statute's text or legislative history shows that Congress
expects an agency to promulgate regulations, as with alcohol labeling, 23 5 an agency may enjoy wide discretion in its choice of regulatory strategy. Therefore, OIRA review is most likely to produce a
statutory violation by causing an agency to consider a factor not relevant under the governing statute.23 6 The problem is likely to arise
§§ 201-211 (1982). Under section 205(e), alcoholic beverages are to be "labeled in conformity with such regulations, to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury, ... as
will provide the consumer with adequate information as to the identity and quality of the
products."
228. 27 C.F.R. § 4.32 (1981).

229. See supra text accompanying notes 86-89.
230. 46 Fed. Reg. 24,963 (1981).
231. 46 Fed. Reg. 55,093 (1981).
232. Centerfor Science in the Pub. Interest v. Department of the Treasury, 573 F. Supp. 1168,
1174 (D.D.C. 1983).
233. Id. at 1175-76.
234. Indeed, the court heightened the intensity of its scrutiny because the case in-

volved "an action which reverses prior policy [rather] than an action setting policy for
the first time." Id. at 1173. In Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983), the Supreme Court subsequently held that the standard of

review for recission of a rule is the same as that for rule promulgation. Id. at 41-42.
235. See Centerfor Science, 573 F. Supp. at 1170.

236. This relevancy requirement stems from Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc.
v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (197 1) (stating that a reviewing court must consider whether
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as it did in the alcohol labeling case-a court reads a statute to forbid considerations of cost, although that is the focus of the executive
order program. Because OMB requires the performance of costbenefit analysis even when it may not enter the calculus 23of7 statutory
decision, the potential for a misstep is especially great.

Controversy of this sort has arisen repeatedly under other health
and safety statutes. Administration of the OSH Act, for which the
Supreme Court has forbidden a cost-benefit approach, 2 38 has produced other disagreements as sharp as the one concerning ethylene
oxide. 2 39 The EPA's setting of National Ambient Air Quality Standards has led to contention with OMB over the permissibility of
considering cost.240 And the FDA's regulation of color additives

under the "Delaney Clause," which forbids marketing cancer-causing food additives, has sparked debate over the legality of OMB's
24 1
suggested "de minimis" exception when cancer risks are low.

Many of these controversies will simmer until the courts either
authoritatively construe the governing statutes or defer to executive
interpretations under Chevron. Even then, charges will arise that impermissible factors have actually affected decisions, notwithstanding
denials by OMB and perhaps the agencies as well. In Part VI of this
Article, I discuss the potential for public disclosures about the process to allay these concerns.
Contentious relations with congressional committees are likely to
continue. As long as Congress continues to be organized by the
party not holding the White House, the committees are likely to
have a different policy orientation from OIRA. In Congress, policy
disagreement with an agency is often cast in terms of the agency's
violation of its statute. To mute the criticisms that are framed in
legal terms-and to forestall their possible adoption by reviewing
courts-agencies and OIRA should strive to buttress their legal
stances more thoroughly than they did in the asbestos and alcohol
labeling cases.
F.

OMB's Statutory Power Over Rules: The Paperwork Reduction Act

Since 1942, the President's budget agency has possessed power to
control federal agencies' imposition of paperwork requirements on
the decision of an agency was based on the relevant factors set forth in the governing
statute). The Court extended this requirement to informal rulemaking in State Farm.
463 U.S. at 43; see supra text accompanying notes 176-77.
237. Regulatory Reform Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the HouseJudiciary Comm., 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 981-82 (1983) (providing OIRA's response to questions from the Subcommittee).
238. American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 540 (1981).
239. See, e.g., SUBCOMM. OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, OFFICE
OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET INTERFERENCE WITH OSHA RULEMAKING, H.R. REP. No.
583, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983) (discussing disagreements over toxic chemical regula-

tions and commercial diving standards).
240. S. REP. No. 156, supra note 183, at 30.
241. HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, HHS' FAILURE TO ENFORCE THE
FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT: THE CASE OF CANCER-CAUSING COLOR ADDITIVES,
H.R. REP. No. 151, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1985) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 151].
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the public. 2 4 2 This function owes its present form to the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1980 (the Act), 24 3 which created OIRA. 2 44 The
Act recognizes the implications of granting OIRA power over reporting and recordkeeping requirements that are contained in regulations. Information collection is so central to many federal
programs that its control can confer de facto power over regulation
itself.2 45
The Act adopts a procedural approach to this problem. Copies of
proposed rules that include an information collection requirement
must be sent to OMB, which has sixty days to file public comments
on whether the requirement is "necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency, including whether the information will have practical utility." 2 46 The agency must respond to
OMB's comments when it promulgates its final rule. OMB then has
sixty days to disapprove the requirement upon a finding that the
agency's response was unreasonable. 2 47 For executive agencies,
OMB's action is final; independent agencies,
however, may override
24 8
such disapproval by majority vote.
Within OIRA, administration of the Act is combined with administration of Executive Order No. 12,291. Desk officers review rules
of particular agencies, whether or not they contain a paperwork request, under similar criteria: whether the agency action is justified
by its benefits and whether burdens have been minimized. 249 There
are some procedural differences between the two kinds of review,
however. OIRA maintains public files on paperwork matters, which
contain the public's comments on submissions. At first, OIRA did
2 50
not include all correspondence between OMB and the agencies.
251
An amendment to the Act now requires it to do so.
As in the
242.
243.
244.
245.

Federal Reports Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-831, 56 Stat. 1078.
Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (codified at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520 (1982)).
See supra text accompanying notes 92-93.
44 U.S.C. § 3518(e) says, however, that nothing in the Act "shall be interpreted

as increasing or decreasing the authority of the President [or] the Office of Management
and Budget... with respect to the substantive policies and programs of ... agencies."
See S. REP. No. 930, supra note 93, at 56.
246. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3504(h), 3508. OMB has issued new regulations requiring that
agency submissions provide more information to the public, such as estimates of the
burden imposed by the reporting requirement. See 53 Fed. Reg. 16,618 (1988) (amending 5 C.F.R. pt. 1320).
247. 44 U.S.C. § 3504(h).

248. Id. §§ 3504(h)(7), 3507(c). Under section 3504(h)(9), "[t]here shall be nojudicial review of any kind of the Director's decision to approve or not to act upon" a
requirement.
249. See Funk, The PaperworkReduction Act: PaperworkReduction Mfeets Administrative Law,
24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 88-91 (1987). OIRA has developed a handbook to guide desk
officers in implementing the Act. See OIRA, INFORMATION COLLECTION REvIEW HANDBOOK (draft ed. Sept., 1988) (copy on file with author).
250. Funk, supra note 249, at 92.
251. 44 U.S.C. § 3507(h) (Supp. IV 1986); see 53 Fed. Reg. 16,618; 16,620-21 (1988)
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executive order program, there is much oral communication with
the agencies that is not reflected in the public record. 2 52 OIRA
places an explanation for paperwork disapprovals in the public file
along with any separate letter to the agency that states the rationale
2 53
in greater detail.
In United Steelworkers v. Pendergrass,25 4 the Third Circuit considered
the Act's scope. The case concerned OSHA's rule requiring employers to warn workers of potentially hazardous materials in the
workplace. 255 OIRA disapproved requirements for exchange of
chemical manufacturers' disclosure sheets at multi-employer worksites, and also disapproved certain exemptions from duplicative labeling requirements. The court held that the Act's reference to
"information collection requests" did not include requirements that
information be provided by industry to the public, as distinguished
from requirements
that information be furnished to the
25 6
government.
In dicta, the court also stressed the Act's disclaimer of intent to
increase OMB's authority over substantive policy decisions delegated to agencies. 2 57 Although the court's holding provides a relatively clear limit to OIRA authority, its concern over indirect effects
on policy suggests that OIRA and the courts may struggle over the
relationship between paperwork functions and cost-benefit review.
The executive order processes tend to displace the Act's formal
ones because of timing.2 5 8 Because OIRA reviews rules before they
are formally proposed or issued, its negotiation with agencies can
and does concern both substantive and paperwork matters, leaving
little for the Act's post-notice process. This procedure suggests that
the executive order may give OMB as much leverage as it can usefully employ. Neither the working relationships between the agencies and OMB nor the overall rate of rejection of agency proposals
seem to differ sharply under the two programs.2 59 This is not really
surprising. To the extent that paperwork requirements mirror the
rules they enforce, they should evoke the same OMB reactions as do
the rules. And the limits of OMB's peremptory behavior may be set
more by such bureaucratic imponderables as general relationships
with the agency head than by the existence of formal statutory
power.
(to be codified at 5 C.F.R. pt. 1320). There is an exception to this requirement for

classified material. 44 U.S.C. § 3507(h).
252. Olson, supra note 148, at 55-59.
253. See SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 99TH CONG., 2D SESS., OMB REVIEW OF CDC RESEARCH: IMPACT
OF THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT 24, 32-37 (Comm. Print 1986).
254. 855 F.2d 108 (3d Cir. 1988).
255. Id. at 110.
256. Id. at 112-13. Thus, the court implicitly determined either that the Act's ban on
judicial review of paperwork approvals does not bar review of disapprovals or that a
disapproval must be of paperwork within the Act's scope to be shielded from review. See
Funk, supra note 249, at 79-80.
257. 855 F.2d at 111- 13.
258. Funk, supra note 249, at 94-95.
259. Id. at 99-103.
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G. JudicialReview of Executive Order Requirements
Executive Order No. 12,291 attempts to foreclose judicial review
of agency compliance with its requirements. It provides that the order "is intended only to improve the internal management of the
Federal government, and is not intended to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law." 2 60 In other executive order programs, courts have declined to allow private
parties to force agency compliance with presidential mandates. For
example, in In re Surface Mining Regulation Litigation,26 1 the court considered a challenge to regulations that was based partly on the
agency's asserted failure to prepare an inflation impact statement in
accordance with Executive Order No. 11,821.262 The court agreed
with an earlier decision that the executive order "was intended primarily as a managerial tool for implementing the President's personal economic policies and not as a legal framework enforceable by
private civil action." 26 3 Accordingly, it would not review agency
compliance with the order.
The court's approach in Surface Mining was quite conclusory, perhaps because it is very unlikely that the President can confer or remove federal court jurisdiction by executive order. Yet it seems
appropriate for courts to recognize a President's wishes about the
consequences of his own programs, at least as a matter of comity.
Here a careful distinction must be made. Of course, courts must
inquire whether a regulation is justified on the administrative record. They may consider materials placed in the record pursuant to
executive oversight, such as regulatory analyses, as part of the overall question of the validity of the rule. To date, that is what they
have done. 264 But it is quite another thing to consider separately
whether the agencr has complied with an executive order's requirements, and to reverse its action if it has not.
The burdens of separate litigation over agency compliance with
an order would exceed their benefits. Under executive order programs lacking central enforcement provisions (such as Executive
Order No. 11,821), agency noncompliance was frequent enough to
tempt private parties and courts to perform a task that the executive
could do for itself. As experience under Executive Order No.
260. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprintedin 5 U.S.C. § 601 note at
431, 434 (1982).
261. 627 F.2d 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
262. Exec. Order No. 11,821, 3 C.F.R. 926 (1971-1975), as amended by Exec. Order
No. 11,949, 3 C.F.R. 161 (1977), reprinted in 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note at 592-93 (1976).
263. 627 F.2d at 1357 (quoting Independent Meat Packers Ass'n v. Butz, 526 F.2d
228, 236 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 966 (1976)).
264. McGarity, supra note 118, at 1318-30.
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12,291 has amply demonstrated, however, OIRA can deal with recalcitrant agencies. 265 The histories of asbestos and ethylene oxide
regulation do not portray an executive in need of outside aid.
VI.

The Openness of OMB Oversight

The extent to which OMB oversight of federal rulemaking is
openly reflected in an agency's administrative record raises two
legal issues. Both are clouded by uncertainty and debate. First, to
what extent are unrecorded "ex parte" contacts permissible in
rulemaking? Second, does the President's constitutional executive
privilege extend to OIRA's discussions with agencies about their
rules? Obviously, these issues are related. They have produced a
wealth of analysis, if not agreement. 26 6 Much of the commentary
mixes law and policy, often without clearly distinguishing between
them. I will try to identify the law/policy border in the following
discussion.
Neither the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 26 7 nor the Due
Process Clause provides a general bar to ex parte contacts in
rulemaking, 268 although some statutes limit them for particular programs. 26 9 Courts reviewing rules have struggled with two rather inconsistent directives from the Supreme Court, and have
consequently produced a confused body of case law.2 70 In Vermont
27 1
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc.,
the Court held that courts may not compel agencies to follow procedures that are not required by statute or by due process. 27 2 State
Farm emphasized, however, that an agency's administrative record
27 3
must provide full substantive justification for its policy choices.
The application of these competing considerations to ex parte
contacts within the executive branch was ably analyzed in Sierra Club
2 74

v. Costle:

The purposes of full-record review which underlie the need for
disclosing ex parte conversations in some settings.do not require
that courts know the details of every White House contact ... in
265. For arguments in favor of limited judicial review, see Raven-Hansen, Making
Agencies Follow Orders: Judicial Review of Agency Violations of Executive Order 12,291, 1983
DUKE LJ. 285, 344-51; Note, Enforcing Executive Orders: Judicial Review of Agency Action
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 55 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 659, 681-86 (1987).
266. See generally Symposium on Presidential Control of Rulemaking, 56 TUL. L. REV. 811
(1982); Verkuil,Jawboning AdministrativeAgencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White House, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 943 (1980).
267. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-561, 701-706 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
268. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 542 & n.16 (1978); Gellhorn & Robinson, Rulemaking "Due Process"." An Inconclusive Dialogue, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 201 (1981).
269. E.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (1982).
270. See generally G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRUFF, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRO-

CESS 367-84 (3d ed. 1986).
271.

435 U.S. 519 (1978).

272. Id. at 542; see Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure,
91 HARV. L. REV. 1805 (1978).
273. 463 U.S. 29, 56-57 (1983).
274. 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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this informal rulemaking setting. After all, any rule issued here
with or without White House assistance must have the requisite
factual support in the rulemaking record ....The courts will monitor all this, but they need not be omniscient to perform their role
effectively. Of course, it is always possible that undisclosed Presidential prodding may direct an outcome that is factually based on
the record, but different from the outcome that would have obtained in the absence of Presidential involvement. In such a case,
it would be true that the political process did affect the outcome in
a way the courts could not police. But we do not believe that Congress intended that the courts convert informal rulemaking into a
rarified technocratic process, unaffected by2 75political considerations or the presence of Presidential power.
Reflecting a similar analysis, the Administrative Conference 2 76 has
recommended that rulemakers "should be free to receive written or
oral policy advice" from elsewhere in the executive branch, "without having a duty to place these intragovernmental communications
in the public file of the rulemaking," unless they contain "material
factual information (as distinct from indications of governmental
policy) .,277

A.

The Problem of Conduit Communications

OIRA review can provide a "conduit" by which the views of interested private persons reach an agency, without submission to the
publicly available record of a rulemaking. These communications
pose two kinds of problems. First, they may include new factual information or policy arguments which escape the testing process to
which other material in the agency's possession is subjected by public comment. Second, due to their endorsement by OMB, they may
assume special prominence in the agency's analysis, risking unfairness to those interested persons who do not enjoy the same access.
These concerns for the integrity of the administrative record and for
fairness to the public sound partly in law and partly in policy. They
have resulted in a recommendation by the Administrative Conference that all conduit 2communications
be revealed in the public rec78
ord of a rulemaking.
Soon after issuance of Executive Order No. 12,291, the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) advised OMB regarding ex parte contacts with agencies:
275. Id. at 407-08.
276. The Administrative Conference of the United States is a federal agency that formulates recommendations to improve the procedures of the agencies. 5 U.S.C. §§ 571576 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
277. 1 C.F.R. § 305.80-6 (1988).
278. Id.
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You and your staff may freely contact agencies regarding the substance of proposed regulations, and may do so by way of telephone calls, meetings, or other forms of communication
unavailable to members of the public.
...[R]ulemaking agencies should disclose in the administrative
file ...substantive communications from your Office to the extent
that they are (1) purely factual as opposed to deliberative in nature, or (2) received by your Office from a source outside of executive or independent agencies.
Notwithstanding these general recommendations, we believe that
the rulemaking agency need not disclose substantive communications from your
Office which form part of the agency's delibera27 9
tive process.
Thus, OLC's advice followed the emerging consensus among administrative lawyers regarding ex parte contacts. OMB adopted it,
but not completely. In a memorandum instructing agencies on procedures under the new executive order, OMB stressed that "[b]oth
the public and the agencies should understand that the primary forum for receiving factual communications concerning proposed
rules is the agency." 2 8 0 Therefore, factual materials sent to OMB
were also to be sent to the agencies for inclusion in the record, and
OMB promised to identify as "appropriate for the whole record of
the agency rulemaking" any factual material that it developed or received and then transmitted to an agency. 28 1 Omitted from this formulation was policy material received from outside the government.
OMB would soon encounter substantial controversy concerning its
use.
A number of health and safety rulemakings during the Reagan administration have produced complaints about conduit communications. Congressional committees overseeing the programs proved
sympathetic to these complaints, and brought increasing pressure
on OIRA to alter its procedures. OIRA has consistently denied that
it has served as a conduit. 2 82 Especially in the early years of the
executive order program, however, OMB engaged in many meetings and informal contacts with interested persons, most of whom
represented regulated industries. 2 83 Because of OMB's heavy workload, this practice created risks that new factual material would
reach agencies without identification by OMB, that policy positions
279. Contacts Between the Office of Management and Budget and Executive Branch
Agencies Under Executive Order No. 12,291 (Apr. 24, 1981), reprinted in 5 Op. Off.
Legal Counsel 107, 110-12 (1981).
280. Office of Management and Budget, Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Subject: Certain Communications Pursuant to Executive Order 12291, "Federal Regulation" (June 11, 1981), reprinted in 1988-89 REGULATORY
PROGRAM, supra note 122, app. III at 540.

281. Id.

282. See, e.g., Olson, supra note 148, at 55 n.281.
283. Id. at 55-62, 69-71; Role of OMB in Regulation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigationsof the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
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of outsiders would be accepted uncritically by OMB, and that the
Charges arose that all
process would display a bias toward 28industry.
4
three of these effects were present.
EPA provided one primary field of controversy. In the asbestos
rulemaking, it was charged that there were about twenty communications (letters, meetings, and telephone calls) between OIRA and
the asbestos industry and other interested persons.2 8 5 A committee
thought that legal and policy arguments that OIRA sent to EPA
"closely track[ed] arguments made.., by the Asbestos Information
Association in a letter to OMB. ' 28 6 OMB denies having had meetings or telephone conversations with industry representatives, and
insists that its positions were developed independently and were
later adopted by the industry.2 8 7 There were meetings at OMB, but
they were with representatives of the Canadian government and the
Interior Department.
In OSHA's ethylene oxide rulemaking, a committee concluded
that OMB arguments against the short-term exposure limit "apparently repeat[ed] industry arguments which had already been rejected by OSHA." ' 28 8 One House report found that OMB met with
industry representatives regarding at least two other OSHA
rulemakings.2 8 9 A second report found that the FDA's rulemaking
on carcinogenic color additives resulted in industry letters to and
meetings with OIRA, which then repeated industry arguments to
2 90
the FDA.
Several features of these cases probably helped to exacerbate relationships with the congressional oversight committees, whose reports developed a notably hostile tone. First, partisan politics
58-61 (1981) (providing an OMB list of 36 meetings in early 1981, 33 of them with
industry representatives).
284. SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY
AND COMMERCE, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., INVESTIGATION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT'S CLAIM OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE OVER EPA

282-94 (Comm.
Print 1984).
285. EPA's Asbestos Regulations: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Oversightand Investigations
of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 231-37 (1985); see also
DOCUMENTS, ABUSES IN THE SUPERFUND PROGRAM, AND OTHER MATrERS

SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND
COMMERCE, 99TH CONG., IST SESS., EPA's ASBESTOS REGULATIONS: REPORT ON A CASE
STUDY ON OMB INTERFERENCE IN AGENCY RULEMAKING 103 (Comm. Print 1985) (noting

more than 30 ex parte communications by EPA and OMB officials).
286. S. REP. No. 156, supra note 102, at 15, 24-25. In another rulemaking, on water
pollutant guidelines, it seemed to EPA's Chief of Staff that comments from OMB "were
of such a particularized technical nature... in an engineering sense, that they would

have had to have come from someone other than the staff of OMB itself." Superfund
Hearings,supra note 157, pt. 3, at 5 (statement of former EPA Chief of StaffJohn Daniel).
287. OMB posits that the accusations of industry contacts came from the presence in
OMB files of papers from the public docket of the agency.
288. S. REP. No. 156, supra note 102, at 32.
289. H.R. REP. No. 583, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 11 (1983).
290. H.R. REP. No. 151, supra note 241, at 59-62.
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undoubtedly played a role, as the administration and the committees squabbled over the direction regulatory policy should take.
Second, in rulemaking it is often difficult to separate fact from policy, so OMB may have appeared to be violating its own rules-or,
indeed, it may have done so. Third, the administration's emphasis
on regulatory relief and the frequency of its contacts with industry
groups opened OMB to portrayal as a special pleader for industry,
instead of a critic prepared to see both the costs and benefits of
regulation.
B.

Conflict and Compromise: The Evolution of OMB's Disclosure Policy

By 1986, OMB was under serious pressure from both Houses of
Congress. The Chairmen of three important House committees
joined in an effort to deny OIRA any appropriations until limits to
its powers were enacted. 2 9 ' In the Senate, members of the Commit29 2
tee on Governmental Affairs pressed OMB to open its processes.
OMB wanted to obtain reauthorization of the Paperwork Reduction
Act and to stop the "defunding" move in the House. InJune, 1986,
OIRA Administrator Gramm issued a memorandum announcing
new disclosure procedures. 29 3 There were two antecedents for
these procedures: a Senate amendment to a paperwork reauthorization bill in 1984,294 which failed to pass, and a special2 95
agreement
OMB reached with EPA in 1985 for review of its rules.
Under the 1986 procedures, OIRA makes available copies of draft
notices of proposed rulemaking and final rules that are submitted
for review, along with copies of all related correspondence between
OIRA and agency heads.2 96 These documents are available once
the notices or final rules have been published in the Federal Register. Similarly, OIRA provides on request copies of agency submissions under Executive Order No. 12,498, following publication of
2 97
the final Regulatory Program.
291. They were Chairman Dingell of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, Chairman Brooks of the Government
Operations Committee, and Chairman Whitten of the Appropriations Committee.
292. Senators Durenberger and Levin led the effort. See Oversight of the Office of Management and Budget Regulatory Review and Planning Process: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
IntergovernmentalRelations of the Senate Comm. on GovernmentalAffairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
56-58, 97-98 (1986).
293. OMB, Memorandum for the Heads of Departments and Agencies Subject to Executive Order Nos. 12,291 and 12,498, Subject: Additional Procedures Concerning
OIRA Reviews Under Executive Order Nos. 12,291 and 12,498 (June 13, 1986) [hereinafterJune 13, 1986 Memo] (rev. Aug. 8, 1986), reprinted in 1988-89 REGULATORY PROGRAMS, supra note 122, app. III, at 529-31.
294. SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1984, S. REP. No. 576, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-23, 35 (1984).
295. Letter from Robert P. Bedell, Deputy Administrator, OIRA, to A. James Barnes,
Deputy Administrator, EPA (May 30, 1985), reprinted in 1988-89 REGULATORY PROGRAM,
supra note 122, app. III at 542-43.
296. June 13, 1986 Memo, supra note 293. Also now available are drafts of advance
notices of proposed rulemaking, and lists, at the end of each month, of all notices and
final rules for which OMB has completed review. Id.

297. Id.
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OIRA also agreed to stricter controls on "conduit" communications from persons outside the federal government. For these added controls OIRA referred to its earlier procedures for EPA, along
298
with an offer to extend them to any other agency so requesting.
OIRA sends these agencies copies of all written material from outsiders, advises them of all oral communications, 2 99 and invites
3 0 0 It
agency personnel to attend meetings concerning their rules.
also makes available in its public reading room written materials and
lists of meetings and communications involving persons outside the
federal government.
These procedures have removed some, but not all, of the controversy over the openness of OMB review. 3 0 1 For review under Executive Order No. 12,291,302 the significant gaps in disclosure are: (1)
the absence of draft notices and rules that are withdrawn by the
agency and never issued; (2) the absence of correspondence between OIRA desk officers and subordinate agency personnel; and
(3) the absence of summaries of oral communications between
OIRA and the agencies.
C.

The Scope of Executive Privilege

Analysis of the appropriate degree of openness of OMB review of
rulemaking must consider the role of executive privilege, which may
provide a constitutional bar to some measures. Two Supreme
Court cases have shed some light on the problem. In United States v.
Nixon,3 0 3 the Court recognized a constitutional executive privilege
298. These agencies now include the Departments of Housing and Urban Development, Labor, Transportation, and the Treasury. Id. at 15.
299. The practice regarding oral communications is short of logging, in the sense of a
summary of the substance of a conversation. Instead, notice is given of the source and
subject matter of each conversation.
300. Since 1981, OIRA has allowed only the Administrator and Deputy Administrator to "meet or discuss a rule under Executive Order 12,291 review," with persons
outside the executive branch unless others are specially authorized. 1988-89 REGULATORY PROGRAM, supra note 122, at 15 n.2 1. This limit has been blurred somewhat, however, by the opportunity for OIRA staff to meet with outsiders on paperwork
requirement reviews. See Olson, supra note 148, at 62-64.
301. The 1986 procedures parallel earlier recommendations of the Administrative
Law Section of the American Bar Association. See Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 101, at
193, 207 (urging OMB to make agency drafts prepared under Executive Order Nos.
12,291 and 12,498 available to relevant congressional committees after the rulemaking
activity is complete). The Administrative Conference subsequently adopted a recommendation closely resembling the 1986 procedures, modifying its earlier stance dis-

cussed supra, text accompanying notes 276-77. See 54 Fed. Reg. 5207 (1989).
302. For matters concerning Executive Order No. 12,498, see infra text accompanying notes 331-37.
303. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). See generally Symposium: United States v. Nixon, 22 UCLA L.
REV. I (1974).
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based on the President's need for confidential policy deliberations.3 0 4 The privilege was qualified, however, 30 5 and in Nixon itself
was overridden
by the need of the courts for evidence in a criminal
30 6
case.
The Court's use of a functional, balancing approach was repeated
in Nixon v. Administrator of GeneralServices, 30 7 in which the Court upheld the power of Congress to regulate presidential papers. From a
separation of powers standpoint, the Court said,
the proper inquiry focuses on the extent to which [the Act] prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions. Only where the potential for disruption is
present must we then determine whether that impact is justified
by an overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress.3 0 8
The Court found that the activities of records archivists would cause
only a limited intrusion on confidentiality, and were therefore justified by congressional needs to preserve history. It pointed out that
confidentiality is a wasting asset subject to erosion by the creation of
presidential libraries, the memoirs of participants, and the efforts of
historians. 3 09
Congress has been of two minds about executive confidentiality.
On the one hand, it has entirely exempted the President and his

immediate staff from the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),310

and has provided an exemption from forced disclosure for deliberative materials generated elsewhere in the executive branch.3 11 Accordingly, in Wolfe v. Department of Health and Human Services,3

12

the

D.C. Circuit held that FOIA exempts from disclosure material in a
"regulations log" that HHS used to indicate which FDA proposals
were being reviewed by HHS or OMB.3 1 3 On the other hand, Congress has repeatedly sought to override claims of executive privilege
in order to obtain material in the hands of the executive for its own
304. 418 U.S. at 703-16.
305. See id. at 706 (refusing to sustain an "absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege
of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances").
306. Id. at 713.
307. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
308. Id. at 443 (citation omitted).
309. Id. at 450-51, 454. The Court observed that most materials in presidential libraries are open, with lessening restrictions over time. Id. at 450 n. 12. The Presidential
Records Act of 1978, 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2207 (1982 & Supp. III 1986), restricts access
to the President's deliberations with his advisers for not more than 12 years. Id.
§ 2204(a) (1982); see also PresidentialRecords Act of 1978: Hearingson H.R. 10998 and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 88 (1978) (providing testimony by the Department of Justice in support of the
constitutionality of the Act).
310. Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 156
(1980) (stating that FOIA's legislative history unambiguously indicates that Congress
intended that the President and his immediate staff whose sole function is to "advise and
assist" him be exempt from FOIA).
311. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1982); see NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132,
150 (1975).
312. 839 F.2d 768 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc).
313. Id. at 771.
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use.3 1 4 Courts have not announced any clear rules for these congressional-executive contests over information, 3 15 and it is often difficult to litigate them at all. 3 16 Consequently, informal negotiation
and struggle dominate, with congressional committees obtaining
enough and enjoy
most information they desire if they are persistent
3 17
the support of their house of Congress.
Thus, it would not reflect actual government practice to argue
that the executive branch possesses a nonwaivable executive privilege for all deliberative material it generates. The executive has
sometimes made such claims as a tactic in contests over information,
yet it often releases such materials to congressional committees or
to members of the public. Indeed, the 1986 compromise between
OIRA and its oversight committees is one example of the contingent nature of executive confidentiality as it actually operates.
The executive branch has, however, two strong claims for confidentiality. First, deliberations between the President and his immediate advisers (which were involved in Nixon itself) implicate the
President's ability to perform his constitutional functions, and deserve a strong presumption of confidentiality. Thus, if the President
or his immediate advisers wish to discuss regulatory policy with an
agency head, their conversations need not reach the administrative
record. 3 18 This privilege does not necessarily mean, however, that
communications between OIRA and agencies deserve the same
3 19
treatment.
Second, throughout the executive branch there is an essentially
unvarying interest in protecting policy discussion while a decision is
under consideration, as opposed to after the fact. This is not a matter of encouraging candid advice, which needs long-term protection
to flourish. Instead, it is a matter of power over the policy decision
itself. When deliberation on a pending decision is open, it is very
hard to limit the lobbying of every interested person and to control
the situation. With these considerations in mind, I now turn to specifics on the openness of OMB oversight.
314. See generally Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1383 (1974) (providing a
discussion of executive privilege); Shane, Legal Disagreementand Negotiation in a Government
of Laws: The Case of Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress, 71 MINN. L. REV. 461 (1987)
(same).
315. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 567 F.2d 121, 128-29 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (concluding that a congressional-executive impasse requires a '"judicial balancing
of executive and legislative interests").
316. See, e.g., United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150, 152-53
(D.D.C. 1983) (dismissing as nonjusticiable a suit for declaratory judgment brought by
the executive branch to compel disclosure of certain documents by EPA Administrator
Anne Gorsuch).
317. See P. SHANE & H. BRUFF, THE LAW OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 187-208 (1988), for
case studies that support this proposition.
318. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
319. See infra notes 323-30 and accompanying text.
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D. Protecting the Administrative Record: A Paper Trail Or A Logging
Requirement?
Regulatory oversight evolved substantially during the Reagan administration. The NAPA Report concluded that "while it appeared
originally to respond to the demands of regulated industries for regulatory relief and to operate with little public and congressional
scrutiny, it is now more open and restrained." 3 20 NAPA called for
even more openness, recommending that agencies "log, summarize,
and include in the rulemaking record all communications from
outside parties, OMB, or other executive or legislative branch offi32
cials concerning the merits of proposed regulations." 1
NAPA's approach is not the only acceptable one. 3 22 Any particular disclosure feature should be judged by its marginal contribution
to the values served by openness, weighed against its marginal burdens and its interference with the values served by confidentiality. I
proceed by analyzing increasing levels of disclosure.
The 1986 compromise between OMB and the committees produces a "paper trail" of oversight activity. Those interested can
track the written portions of OMB's activity to check its wisdom and
legality. Knowing that this trail is being left, those within OIRA and
the agencies can be expected to ensure that their interchange is
within legal limits. Presumably, however, candor suffers somewhat.
The effects are both good and bad. Pressure to ignore the administrative record or statutory limits might be less likely to occur when
information must be delivered orally, and to that extent furtively.
On the other hand, written advice may be crafted for the public eye,
with more posturing and less incisiveness.
Less than this amount of disclosure does not seem desirable. In
the early years of the Reagan administration's program, charges frequently arose that OMB was pressing an agency beyond the parameters justified by its statute or its administrative record. Under the
pressure of congressional investigation, a paper trail of each controversial rulemaking emerged to allow resolution of the dispute. This
pattern of inquiry and eventual disclosure, with its heavy transaction
costs for all concerned, is likely to recur unless a paper trail is routinely provided. Similarly, the new controls on conduit communications seem necessary to ensure the fairness of executive oversight.
The 1986 compromise does not, however, produce a complete
320. NAPA REPORT, supra note 120, at 7.
321. Id. at 35. NAPA explained:
Just as agency decisionmaking can be improved by subjecting it to external
scrutiny, so can OMB's analyses of agency proposals benefit from outside
review. The same arguments used to justify OMB review itself-that agencies need to articulate formally what they are doing and why their actions are
appropriate-apply equally to OMB.
Id. In his separate views, Richard Wegman called for placing any centralized control

early in the rulemaking process. If it occurs during the comment period or before, he
argued, the public can react to it. He would avoid all post-comment period involvement
as too productive of "political mischief." Id. at 44.
322. For a similar approach, see S. 2023, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (providing for
the establishment of a file concerning the review of rules by the President)
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paper trail. One omitted category is notices and rules that are withdrawn by an agency. Adding these items would not pose much added burden for the agencies and OMB. Indeed, the availability of
submissions for the Regulatory Program pursuant to Executive Order No. 12,498, whether or not the initiative matures in a notice of
proposed rulemaking, shows that such an addition would be
feasible.
The 1986 compromise also does not reveal correspondence
among subordinate personnel, for example memoranda exchanged
by desk officers and agency staff, although congressional inquiries
or leaks often reveal them. The routine availability of these items
would materially aid understanding of the oversight process, only a
portion of which appears in formal written communications between
the Administrator of OIRA and agency heads. Also, pressure to ignore an agency's statute or administrative record can occur at any
level of the process. On the other hand, revealing staff dialogue
might blur political accountability within both OIRA and the agencies by inviting observers to wonder who speaks for the institution,
the staff or the political appointee at the top. Knowing their correspondence would be made public, staff could try to bind their superiors by taking strong positions in print. On balance, I think this
material should be available, although the issue is close.
Another possible modification of the 1986 procedures would be
to require agency drafts to be published in the Federal Register simultaneously with their submission to OMB. I think it better to
make the drafts available only after the rulemaking notices have
been published. Publicity about the pendency of review can only
increase pressure on OIRA to engage in communications with interested persons. Instead, rulemaking procedure should be structured
to guide persons outside the government to the agency, not to
OIRA.
Whether oral communications should be "logged" (summarized
3 23
and placed in the public record) presents another close question.
Longstanding dispute over this procedure has made the arguments
familiar. The traditional conception of rulemaking as an informal,
"quasi-legislative" activity has made unrecorded ex parte contacts
seem permissible. Congress has declined to amend the APA to alter
that view. 3 24 Moreover, an agency must defend its rules in court
323. See Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 270, at 205 (noting the difficulty in articulating guidelines for ex parte contacts and impartiality); Verkuil, supra note 266, at 989
(concluding that the need for a record should not override other interests such as presidential coordination and policymaking).
324. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 474-75 & n.28 (D.C. Cir.
1977). The D.C. Circuit noted that
[i]f Congress wanted to forbid or limit ei parte contact in every case of informal rulemaking, it certainly had a perfect opportunity of doing so when it
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solely on the basis of the public record,
and may not rely on facts or
3 25
policy argument not reflected there.
The NAPA Report finds these considerations outweighed by im3 26
provements that disclosure will bring to the oversight dialogue.
Certainly, OMB pressure to ignore the administrative record or the
statute can be applied as easily by voice as by pen. Yet that pressure
can occur anyway, at higher levels of the executive branch, in ways
that are difficult or impossible to police. For detailed policy argument, there may be no practical alternative to writing. Moreover,
agencies can request that policy advice on a particular matter be
transmitted in writing whenever the content of oral advice appears
to merit that check. A strict logging requirement in OIRA could
simply shift oral discussion up the organization chart, or into the
early rulemaking stages to which logging requirements generally do
not apply.
Logging all oral communications would add a significant burden
to administration. More important, it would alter the relationship
between OMB and the agencies in some undesirable ways. The very
presence of an executive privilege concept recognizes a positive
value in informal discussion. Policy debate tends to feature negotiation and compromise, as the history of OMB oversight illustrates.
Negotiation is not a flower that blooms in sunlight. Therefore,
there is reason to maintain an informal, oral channel of communication between agencies and OIRA, even if more detailed, formal
communication that is written down is available to the public.
The Administrative Conference has recommended that official
written policy guidance to agencies from OIRA be placed in the
public file of the rulemaking after the notice to which it pertains is
issued. 3 27 I would add other written communications between
OIRA and the agencies. Written or oral policy advice from the President or his immediate advisors 328 to agencies need not be disclosed, however, so that the constitutional executive privilege can
enacted the Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat.
1241 .... That it did not extend the ex parte contact provisions of amended

section 557 [which governs adjudication] to section 553 [which governs
rulemaking]-even though such an extension was urged upon it during the
hearing-is a sound indication that Congress still does not favor a per se
prohibition or even a "logging" requirement in all such proceedings.
Id. at 475 n.28.
325. See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
50 (1983) (stating that the courts may not accept post-hoc rationalizations to support
agency action).
326. NAPA REPORT, supra note 120, at 35.
327. 54 Fed. Reg. 5207, 5208 (1989); see supra note 301.
328. A workable definition of this group is the exemption to FOIA discussed supra
note 310 and accompanying text.
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operate.3 2 9 And at least for the present, a universal logging require330
ment seems premature.
E.

Executive Order No. 12,498 and the Planning Process

At the start of its second term, the Reagan administration reached
earlier into the rulemaking process with Executive Order No.
12,498.331 The order requires the head of each executive agency to
send OMB a "draft regulatory program" that describes "all signifi3 32
cant regulatory actions" to be undertaken within the next year.
OMB reviews the plan for consistency with administration policy,
and a final Regulatory Program is published. 33 3 As noted above, the
order's purpose is to give political appointees in OMB and the agen33 4
cies more control over the early stages of rulemaking.
OMB's definition of the significant regulatory actions to which the
order applies is broad. It includes the creation of an agency task
force to evaluate the need for a regulation, the undertaking of studies of economic problems, and an analysis of health and safety risks
that might lead to regulation.3 3 5 Consequently, immediate criticism
arose that the order would stifle investigative activity that would
336
have shown the need for regulation.
OMB's 1986 disclosure policy included a promise to make available all agency drafts submitted to OMB under the order, after publication of the year's Regulatory Program. 33 7 Without the
availability of the drafts, public and congressional monitoring of
OMB's activity would have been extremely difficult. This aspect of
the disclosure policy should be continued. Correspondence between OMB and the agencies, or from persons outside the government, should also be made available. But oral communications
between OMB and the agencies should remain confidential, as they
329. The Administrative Conference would extend this privilege generally to "other
members of the Executive Branch," 54 Fed. Reg. 5207, 5208 (1989), which would subject only OIRA's written advice to disclosure. I would treat written interagency advice
that does not emanate from the President's immediate office similarily to OIRA's.
330. My views were once to the contrary. See Bruff, PresidentialPower andAdministrative
Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 451, 504-06 (1979).
331. Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1986), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 601 app.
at 296-97 (West Supp. 1988).
332. Id.
333. See generally Note, supra note 100.
334. See supra text accompanying notes 100-101; see also DeMuth & Ginsburg, White
House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075 (1986) (providing views of two

former OIRA administrators).
335. OMB, Bulletin 85-9 & Attachment 1 (Jan. 10, 1985).

336. See S. REP. No. 156, supra note 102, at 10-12; Morrison, OMB Interference with
Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1063

(1986).
337.
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traditionally have been at these early stages of the rulemaking process. The purpose of partial disclosure under this executive order
differs, however, from that under Executive Order No. 12,291.
Oversight occurring very early in the rulemaking process is not
likely to pose an identifiable threat of a statutory violation, unless a
statute unequivocally calls for regulation. Nor is it likely to undermine a developed administrative record. Instead, the purpose is
more political, to reveal the road not taken. The interested public
and congressional committees can then decide whether to press for
a different course.
VII.
A.

Defining Exceptions to OMB Oversight

Independent Agencies and Excepted Functions

To date, Presidents have not attempted to apply their regulatory
management executive orders to the independent agencies.
Although President Reagan was advised that he had the constitutional power to include these agencies in the coverage of Executive
Order No. 12,291, he chose not to do so. 33 8 The extent of a President's constitutional power over an agency that Congress has chosen to shield from his supervision has
been a matter of spirited, if
33 9
inconclusive, debate for many years.
The Supreme Court has recently given the debate new life. Morrison v. Olson 3 40 announced a new test for the constitutionality of restrictions on the President's power to remove executive officers:
whether the statutes "impede the President's ability to perform his
constitutional duty." 3 4 ' This test is surely better than the old onewhether an office is "purely executive" 34 2 -with its invitation to
bright lines where the reality of government offers none. Nevertheless, it states but does not answer the central question: What is the
nature of the President's constitutional duty?3 4 3 A narrow definition
might include only the substantive grants of power over foreign affairs and national defense in Article II, and would therefore confer
little supervisory power over rulemaking. A broad definition might
emphasize the President's duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and would envision broad supervisory power.
Some guidance emerges from the Court's holding in Morrison, and
from a distinction it made. The Court upheld independence where
338. Office of Legal Counsel, Department ofJustice, Memorandum for Honorable
David Stockman, Director, OMB, Re: Proposed Executive Order on Federal Regulation
(Feb. 12, 1981), reprinted in P. SHANE & H. BRUFF, supra note 317, at 355-58 (abridged
version).
339. See generally A Symposium on Administrative Law: "The Uneasy ConstitutionalStatus of
the AdministrativeAgencies," 36 AM. U.L. REv. 277 (1987); Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986
Sup. CT. REv. 41.

340. 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
341. Id. at 2619.
342. Humphrey's Exec'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629-32 (1935); see supra text
accompanying notes 30-31.
343. For a summary of the debate over the nature of the President's powers, see supra
text accompanying notes 5-16.

590

[VOL. 57:533

Bruff
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

conflicts of interest undermine normal political accountability, as in
the investigation and prosecution of high-level crime in the executive branch.3 4 4 Ordinary regulation does not pose this problem.
Thus the Court cautioned that special prosecutors do not enjoy
"policymaking or significant administrative authority. '3 4 5 This
statement implies a broad view of presidential power-that placing
policymaking responsibilities in independent agencies infringes the
President's powers by undermining political accountability. Of
3 46
course, the Court left that question for another day.
Any functional, balancing doctrine is uncertain in application.
Nevertheless, the President has a substantial argument that his need
to supervise most regulation of the traditional independent agencies
is no less than for the executive agencies. Much of the policymaking
of the independent agencies is not functionally distinct from that of
executive branch agencies. For example, the Federal Trade Commission, an independent agency, shares antitrust enforcement responsibility with the Department ofJustice. Thus, policies adopted
347
by independent agencies can affect those of executive agencies.
Moreover, congressional difficulties with policy coordination pertain
to all agencies.
Some independent agencies make policy that is vitally important
to our national life; hence presidential interest in its formulation is
both inevitable and proper. The Federal Reserve Board's monetary
functions and the Securities and Exchange Commission's market
regulation come to mind. Nevertheless, congressional perception
of a need to insulate particular kinds of regulation from presidential
supervision is entitled to some judicial deference. How are we to
resolve these imponderables? Fortunately, the Court appears to be
moving away from loose conceptions that whole agencies have a
special constitutional status outside the executive branch, and toward a more focused inquiry whether the President has been denied
a supervisory role that is appropriate to the particular function involved.3 48 That appears to be implicit in Morrison's willingness to
344. See Bruff, supra note 35, at 541-42.
345. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2619.
346. In Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989), the Court rejected a separation of powers challenge to the Sentencing Commission, an independent agency in the
judicial branch that sets mandatory sentencing guidelines. The Court thought that this
function was appropriately placed in the judicial branch because of historically broad
judicial control over sentencing. The Court also remarked that it might be inappropriate to assign this function to the executive branch because that would combine sentencing with prosecution. Id. at 664 n.17.
347. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v' NRC, 598 F.2d 759, 774-76 (3d Cir. 1979)
(upholding the NRC's decision to suspend nuclear fuel recycling at the request of the
President and in deference to his foreign policy efforts to prevent international proliferation of nuclear weapons despite a challenge that such action impermissibly interfered
with the agency's independence).
348. See P. SHANE & H. BRUFF, supra note 317, at 326.
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allow some prosecutorial functions to be made independent, without adopting the position that the entire Department of Justice
could be so insulated.
Therefore, we need to identify kinds of rulemaking programs for
which presidential supervision is not appropriate. The principal inquiry should be whether the executive's accountability can be
trusted. Thus, some federal rulemaking should be excepted from
executive oversight because the President's role as head of his party
may give him a personal interest in the subject matter. Two prominent examples are administration of the Federal Communications
Commission's "equal time" rules3 4 9 and the3 5Federal
Election Com0
mission's regulation of political campaigns.
A second inquiry is whether political accountability would interfere with successful performance of the function. Thus, the Court
might conclude that sound monetary policymaking requires the insulation from normal accountability to both President and Congress
that the Federal Reserve now enjoys because
short-run political con35 1
siderations would hamper this function.
Under this line of inquiry, some kinds of rulemaking functions
should receive categorical exemption from presidential supervision.
Executive Order No. 12,291 does not apply to "formal" rulemaking,
which is performed according to the APA's procedures for adjudication. 3 52 This exception recognizes that the distinction between

rulemaking and adjudication is sometimes blurred. Due process
strictures apply when some individuals are "exceptionally affected,
353
in each case upon individual grounds," by administrative action.
Adjudication has traditionally been protected from outside interference by anyone.3 54 These due process values lurk in the cases upholding agency independence from presidential supervision
3 55
because adjudicating agencies were involved.
When rulemaking resembles adjudication because it involves deciding "conflicting private claims to a valuable privilege," courts
have barred ex parte contacts.3 5 6 Similarly, ratemaking should be
349. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1982); see G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRUFF, supra note
125, at 413-21.
350. See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (providing an exhaustive examination of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, and upholding the constitutionality of the Federal Election Commission's regulation of political campaigns).
351. For an overview of Federal Reserve monetary functions, see W. MELTON, INSIDE
THE FED (1983).
352. Section l(a)(1) of the Order exempts actions "governed by the provisions of
Sections 556 and 557 of Title 5 of the United States Code." See Exec. Order No. 12,291,
3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note at 432 (1982).
353. United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 245 (1973) (quoting BiMetallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 446 (1915)).
354. The APA, 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (1982), bars all ex parte contacts in adjudication
and formal rulemaking.
355. See, e.g., Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 349-56 (1958) (holding that the
President could not remove a member of the adjudicatory War Claims Commission).
356. Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United States, 269 F.2d 221, 224 (D.C.
Cir. 1959) (involving FCC allocation of a limited number of television channels to particular communities).
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excepted from executive oversight. 3 5 7 Such an exception would
also respect the congressional judgment that ratemaking ordinarily
3 58
should be insulated from politics.
In a number of modern statutes, Congress has created rulemaking
programs that are "hybrids" because they employ some adjudicative
procedure. 35 9 This implies that ex parte contacts are inappropriate,
although it does not necessarily compel that conclusion. A statuteby-statute judgment is necessary. For example, a statute may have
addressed executive branch contacts explicitly, partially controlling
them. 3 60 If not, it is necessary to assess whether oversight is appropriate for the substantive issues involved in the program.
B.

The Desirability of Statutory Controls on Oversight

Should a statute be enacted to ratify and control presidential management of regulation? There has been sufficient experience under
the executive orders to justify statutory codification. Moreover, enactment is probably feasible because there are advantages for both
the President and Congress. The President could benefit by resolving lingering doubts about the program's legitimacy, and perhaps
by obtaining its extension to the independent agencies. Congress
could benefit by codifying disclosure practices that aid its capacity to
oversee the program. Existing doubts about legality foster compromise in the legislative process; if the Court removes them with a
broad endorsement of presidential power, the executive may resist
statutory control of the program.
Lingering doubts about legality also affect the present nature of
the program. The behavior of the participants can be expected to
change somewhat under a statutory regime. At present, OMBagency relationships usually feature negotiation. As experience in
separation of powers controversies teaches, that is what we should
357. See ROADS TO REFORM, supra note 42, at 82 (exempting ratemaking from a gen-

eral call for presidential supervision of rulemaking because "although technically
rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act, [it involves] quasi-judicial functions that should be kept separate from the political process"); cf United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 251-56 (1973) (Douglas,J. dissentingjoined by Stewart,

J.) (noting that ratemaking has adjudicative elements, and therefore requires full hearings to ensure the integrity of the ratemaking process).
358. See FEDERAL REGULATION, supra note 46, pt. 5, at 67-81 (explaining that the creation of FERC as an independent agency within a cabinet department was intended to
establish an agency somewhat removed from direct executive control because FERC's
adjudicatory function should be carried out on the merits and not influenced by partisan

considerations and priorities).
359. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 57a (1982) (providing hybrid rulemaking procedures for the
FTC).
360. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(4)(B)(ii) (1982) (requiring under the Clean Air Act

that all written interagency correspondence concerning draft proposed rules be placed
in the rulemaking docket).
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expect in conditions of uncertainty about ultimate power. 36 1 If the
uncertainty is removed, behavior should change somewhat. Statutory ratification of the program could produce a more peremptory
approach by OMB. It is not clear, however, that the change would
be very great. For example, OMB's behavior under the Paperwork
Reduction Act does not seem sharply different from that under the
executive orders. As all students of bureaucracy know, many variables affect OMB-agency relationships-for example, the nature of
the personal relationship between an agency head and the
President.
The informal agreement that OMB reached with its congressional oversight committees in 1986 did not establish a long-term
resolution of the issues that had arisen during the Reagan administration. 36 2 A management program in the new administration will
probably encounter strong pressure to reach a similar modus vivendi
with the committees. In that case, the primary advantages of a statute would be to give Congress an opportunity to decide which
rulemaking programs should be exempt from review, and to enact
more permanent controls.
Congress has begun to consider bills that would forbid or limit
OMB review of particular programs.3 6 3 In the absence of a generally applicable statute, the executive might simply apply its program
to the independent agencies, letting the courts struggle with Monison's criteria to define the limits of executive management. Instead,
the better course would be to put OMB review on a statutory basis,
with controls reflecting experience to date.
Conclusion
Experience under the Reagan administration executive order program reflected several enduring tensions in our scheme of government. Indeed, the orders were drafted to affect the allocation of
power within the executive, and between the executive and Congress. Hence it should surprise no one that conflict attended the
361. Executive privilege controversies between the President and Congress provide a
prominent example. See P. SHANE & H. BRUFF, supra note 317, at 184-208.
362. The denouement of the effort to "defund" OIRA occurred when Senate and
House conferees agreed to reauthorize the Paperwork Reduction Act as part of the continuing resolution passed in October 1986. H.R. CONF. REP. 1005, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
349 (1986). The compromise provided for: (1) a separate line item account for OIRA in
OMB's budget with authorized spending of $5.5 million for the next three years; (2)
Senate confirmation of the administrator of OIRA; and (3) a prohibition on the use of
the funds authorized for "any function or activity which is not specifically authorized or
required by this [Act] .... [T]he review of a rule or regulation is specifically authorized
or required by this [Act] only to the extent that such review is for the sole purpose of
reviewing an information collection request contained in, or derived from, such rule or
regulation." Id. at 355. The sponsors of the reauthorization compromise explained that
OIRA could perform other functions if it obtained separate funding for them. Id. at 771.
The appropriations act also provided $5.5 million for OIRA with no restrictive language, except to continue the prohibition against OMB review of agricultural marketing
orders. Id. at 330.
363. E.g., S. 2443, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) (limiting review of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission).
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relations of OMB with both agencies and congressional committees.
Another enduring tension in administrative law, between law and
politics in regulation, was also present. It was exacerbated (as was
the overall level of conflict) by the adminstration's bias toward industry. From the point of view of the administration, however, the
program enjoyed unprecedented success in imprinting regulation
with the President's own principles.
An executive oversight program of this sort is constitutional, and
is beneficial in its promotion of the political accountability of regulation. Nevertheless, its influence must be kept within the bounds of
discretion conferred by existing statutory policies and the administrative records compiled in the agencies. I believe that the "paper
trail" procedures that developed through OMB-congressional compromise are well suited to that task, with some modifications. In a
new administration, where this experiment in government continues, the time may be ripe to place it on a more permanent statutory
basis.
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